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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court, in a line of several cases over the past decade,
has established a rigorous federal constitutional excessiveness review for
punitive damages awards based on the Due Process Clause. As a matter of
substantive due process, says the Court, punitive awards must be evaluated
by three "guideposts" set forth in BMW of North America v. Gore: the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio between
punitive and compensatory damages, and a comparison of the amount of
punitive damages to any "civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed
for comparable misconduct. " 1 Following up on this pronouncement in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell, the Court
indicated that ''few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive
and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due
process. "2 Unfortunately, neither the "guideposts" nor the single-digit
multiple rule have any basis in the law of due process and represent
nothing more than the imposition of the Court's own standards for
punishment in place of those of the states.
This Article reveals the defectiveness of this jurisprudence by exposing
the absence of precedential foundation for the Court's current view. More
significantly, this Article demonstrates that the Court's interpretation of the
Due Process Clause is at odds with important rules of constitutional
construction, mainly those supplied by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
which protect unenumerated rights and limit the national government to
exercising delegated powers, respectively. Together, these amendments
I.
2.

BMW of N. Arn.,Inc. v. Gore,517 U.S. 559,574-75,580,583 (1996).
State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell,538 U.S. 408,425 (2003).
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prohibit expansive interpretations of the Constitution that disparage rights
retained by the people and that arrogate to the national government
powers that neither the states nor the people ever relinquished. The Court's
interpretation of the Due Process Clause with respect to punitive damages
transgresses both of these limitations. This Article suggests that a proper
understanding of due process reveals that the doctrine requires only that
punitive awards be reserved for wrongdoing beyond simple negligence,
jurors be instructed that any punitive award they impose must be designed
to further states' legitimate interest in punishment of instate conduct and
deterrence, and judicial review of the awards be available to check
adherence to these requirements. Beyond that, the Due Process Clause
fails to require punitive damages awards be constrained to a particular
level.
"The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it
deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."3

I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause is simple
enough in its phrasing-"nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"4-this simplicity has
permitted the clause to be used, and misused,5 as a broad vessel into which
many rights and protections have been poured. The clause has been
variously used as the source of many procedural protections,6 the basis for
incorporating much of the Bill of Rights against the states,7 and as a source
3. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future--0r Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 110 (1999)
(describing the past century as "characterized by misguided effons to ground [fundamental} rights in
the concept of due process").
6. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that procedural due process
requires that a hearing be held before public assistance payments to welfare recipients are
discontinued).
7. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). Duncan states:
The Founeenth Amendment denies the States the power to 'deprive any person of life, libeny,
or property, without due process of law.' In resolving conflicting claims concerning the
meaning of this spacious language, the Coun has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for
guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution
have been held to be protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the
Founeenth Amendment.
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for unenumerated substantive rights, such as the right to privacy. 8
One of the recent contexts in which the clause has been infused with a
novel and untenable interpretation is the area of punitive damages. In BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Court for the first time invalidated a
punitive damages award on the basis of the Due Process Clause,9
announcing, "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits a State from imposing a 'grossly excessive' punishment on a
tortfeasor."10 However, as the Court inaugurated what it termed "the
federal excessiveness inquiry,"11 it never paused to justify its view that the
Due Process Clause places an upper limit on the amount of punitive
damages awards. Relying wholly on its prior case of TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 12 for support, the Court in BMW simply
declared, "Only when an award can fairly be categorized as ' grossly
excessive' in relation to these interests does it enter the zone of
arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."13 TXO itself, however, borrowed this notion from case law
that suggested substantive limits on civil fines and penalties, not punitive
damages awards against tortfeasors.14 More recently, in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, the Court reaffirmed its view
espoused in BMW that due process places substantive limits on the level of
punitive damages awards and boldly pronounced that "few awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages,
to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."15
Close scrutiny of the precedential underpinnings of the Court's
excessiveness jurisprudence reveals that far from reflecting due process
limitations thought by the Court to exist, the Court's move to impose
substantive limits on punitive damages via the Due Process Clause is
completely unsupported by the Court's prior holdings. A review of the
body of precedent shows that the Court has misrepresented and misused the
case law to lend legitimacy to a doctrine it has simply made up. What
history and precedent indicate is that due process has never been construed
to impair the common law practice of states permitting civil juries to award
8. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965).
9. BMW ofN. Arn., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585-86 (1996).
IO. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)
(plurality opinion)).
11. Id. at 568.
12. TXO, 509 U.S. 443.
13. BMW, 511 U.S. at 568 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 456).
14. See infra Part ill.B.4.
15. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-17, 425 (2003).
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exemplary damages at levels they deem appropriate under the
circumstances.
Even more significant than the absence of precedential or historical
support for the Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause is its
complete inconsistency with certain rules of constitutional construction and
the principles of reserved rights and limited powers embodied in the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Ninth Amendment
supplies a rule of construction that forbids expansive interpretations of
constitutional provisions that infringe on rights retained by the people and
the states,16 and the Tenth forbids the national government from arrogating
to itself those powers not delegated to it, but reserved to the states. 17
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause in the
BMW line of cases transgresses both of these limitations. Interpreting the
Due Process Clause in a manner that denies the right of states to empower
civil juries to levy punitive awards at a level of their choosing exploits the
Constitution's failure to provide express protection for jury discretion in
this area as a license to constrain it, an affront to the Ninth Amendment.
Similarly, interpreting the Due Process Clause in a manner that empowers
the Court, or Congress, 18 to substitute its common law preferences for
those of the states' ascribes power to the national government not delegated
to it and certainly reserved to the states, offending the Tenth Amendment.
Both of these points are especially clear in light of the Court's
determination that the Eighth Amendment does not pertain to punitive
damages awards.19 Having failed to limit punitive damages awards in the
very provision where one would expect such a limitation to reside-the
Eighth Amendment-the rules of construction imposed by the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments do not leave such an important matter to esoteric
implication. Indeed, reading substantive limits on punitive damages into the
Due Process Clause after holding that the Eighth Amendment neglects the
topic violates two more basic rules of constitutional construction. The
16. The Ninth Amendment provides, ''The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
17. The Tenth Amendment provides, ''The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
18. Congress has the authority, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Thus, presumably
the Supreme Court's declaration that excessive punitive damages awards violates due process would
mean that Congress should have some authority to legislate in this area to prohibit "excessive" awards.
See infra text accompanying notes 261-62.
19. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 271-76 (1989).
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principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius20 suggests that the Eighth
Amendment's neglect of punitive damages indicates their exclusion. The
rule against constructions that render other provisions of the Constitution
redundant21 prevents infusing the Due Process Clause with a bar against
punitive excessiveness when such an interpretation would make the Eighth
Amendment superfluous.
Although certainly many advocates of tort reform may feel that
punitive damages awards are exorbitant and need to be limited in the
manner suggested by the Court, imposing such limits is a policy goal that
legislatures will have to achieve. 22 The Supreme Court has itself expressed
concern over the level of punitive awards, 23 but rather than defer to
legislatures as the proper institutions for addressing this issue, the Court
has itself chosen to craft a new jurisprudence of excessiveness to achieve
that end. Given the fabricated nature of the Court's doctrine, one suspects
that those who call for "strict constructionism" and deride ')udicial
activism" would otherwise be appalled by the Court's actions were the
Court not so acting for the benefit of a policy goal these same critics tend to
support. 24
20. "Expression of the one is exclusion of the other." Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Couns in a
Civil-Law System: The Role of the Federal Couns in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A
MATIER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
22. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 607 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(noting the "reform measures recently adopted or currently under consideration in legislative arenas"
concerning punitive damages awards).
23. See, e.g., Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing.").
24. Compare the laudatory remarks from the antijudicial activism lobby with respect to the
Court's BMW jurisprudence to the outrage expressed over the Court's recent decision in Keio v. New
London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005), which was as offensive to the Constitution as the BMW line of cases,
but resulted in a policy outcome the antiactivists do not support: the government taking of private
property to further economic development goals of the government.
The anti-activist Cato Institute has criticized the Keio decision as a manifestation of the Court's
"complete disregard for even our explicitly enumerated rights." Radley Balko, An Excess of Power, July
4, 2005, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3974&print=Y (appearing originally on
FoxNews.com). While the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform-no friend of
'judicial activism"-has lauded the Court's holding in State Farm saying, "[T]he U.S. Supreme Court
decision made great strides in providing guidelines to rein in excessive punitive damage awards,"
Institute
for
Legal
Reform,
Issues-Punitive
Damages,
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.org/issues/index.php?p=punitive (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). The
Cato Institute put out an extensive document trying to reconcile its support for the holding of State
Farm with its opposition to judicial activism by casting the issue as follows:
Ultimately, [whether a punitive damages award is excessive] is up to nine justices: not by
imposing their own policy preferences-that would truly be judicial activism-but by
applying the Constitution, based on a proper theory of that document grounded in the
Framers' notions of limited government, separation of powers, federalism, and individual
liberty.
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Such hypocrisy25 aside, it is the task of legal scholars to hold the Court
to account when legally untenable decisions are made, regardless of where
their policy preferences may lie. This Article undertakes that task. Part I
briefly lays out the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence as announced in
BMW and modified by State Farm. Part II consists of a critique of the
doctrine, finding it to be unwise as a matter of legal policy, at odds with the
true meaning of the Due Process Clause, and unsound as a matter of
constitutional law. Once the doctrine has been shown to be little more than
a modern creation of several justices of the Court seeking to achieve certain
policy objectives, Part ill presents the proper constitutional constraints on
the award of punitive damages.
II. THE COURT'S EXCESSIVENESS JURISPRUDENCE
There is no need to rehearse at great length the facts in the cases that
underlie the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence. Others have sufficiently
accomplished that task, and references to those resources will be adequate
for readers interested in a more detailed presentation of the principal
decisions in the BMW line of cases. 26 However, the essentials of the cases
underlying the doctrine and its current content are worth repeating here.
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. is the first case in

which the Supreme Court announced "that the Due Process Clause . . .
imposes substantive limits 'beyond which penalties may not go. "'27 There
had been earlier attempts by litigants to use the Eighth Amendment's

Robert
A.
Levy,
Do's
and
Don'ts
of
Tort
Reform,
May
1,
2005,
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4566. Of course, the same could be said about the
Court's decision in Keio, were these groups interested in defending that decision.
25. This hypocrisy is not unique to the punitive damages context:
Conservatives ate hypocrites when it comes to federalism. On the one hand, throughout
American history, they have advocated the need to protect and advance states' rights. On the
other hand, conservatives are quick to abandon their commitment to states' rights when it gets
in the way of their ideological objectives. Just this yeat, a conservative Congress took class
action suits away from the state courts and put them in federal courts because they like the
results they get in federal courts better. It was the most conservative wing of the Republican
Party that tried to get federal courts to overrule a single state court's decision in the Terri
Schiavo case.
Erwin Cbemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69,
69 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
26. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, I 1029 (2005) (discussing the BMW line of cases from Browning-Ferris through Cooper v. Leatherman);
Garrett T. Chaton, Note, Beyond a Bar of Double-digit Ratios: State Farm v. Campbell's Impact on
Punitive Damages Awards, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 608-16 (2004-05) (reviewing the BMW line of
cases from Browning-Ferris through State Farm).
27. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) (plurality opinion)
(quoting Seaboatd Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)).
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prohibition against excessive fines as a vehicle for imposing the very same
limits on punitive damages awards, but the Court rejected those efforts in
Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Ke/co Disposal, lnc. 28
Although the TXO Court indicated that such limits were found within the
Due Process Clause, that Court did not invalidate the punitive damages
award before it.29 That task fell to the Court only a few years later in BMW
of North America, Inc. v. Gore.3 Citing TXO and the cases cited therein,
the BMW Court reiterated that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a ' grossly excessive'
punishment on a tortfeasor."31 To determine whether the punitive damages
award before it was grossly excessive and in violation of due process, the
BMW Court devised three "guideposts": "the degree of reprehensibility of
the [defendant's misconduct] ; the disparity between the [actual] or potential
harm suffered by [the plaintiff] and [the] punitive damages award; and the
difference between [the punitive damages awarded by the jury] and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases."32

°

Applying these guideposts to a $2 million dollar punitive damages
award accompanying a compensatory award of $4,000, the Court in BMW
invalidated the punitive damages award under review.33 The defendant's
misconduct-failing to inform a customer that the new car he purchased
had been repainted-was dismissed as "purely economic" and "not
sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition of a $2 million exemplary
damages award."34 Regarding the relationship between the punitive award
and the harm inflicted on the plaintiff, the Court concluded that the 500-to
l ratio was "breathtaking" and "'raise[d] a suspicious judicial eyebrow,"'
placing the award beyond the acceptable range.35 Finally, the Court noted
that the maximum criminal penalty for the defendant's misconduct in
Alabama, the plaintiff's home state, would have been $2,000, with other
states authorizing between $5,000 and $ 1 0,000, substantially less than the
punitive award imposed here.36 From these findings the Court concluded
28. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 262-76.
29. TXO, 509 U.S. at 458-62.
30. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 559 (1996).
3 1 . Id. at 562 (quoting TXO 509 U.S. at 454).
32. Id. at 574-75.
33. Id. at 565--66, 574-86. The award imposed by the jury was $4 million; the Alabama Supreme
Court, however, remitted the punitive award down to $2 million in order to remove aspects of the award
that reflected the jury's use of out-of-state conduct. Id. at 567.
34. Id. at 576, 580.
35. Id. at 582--83 (quoting TXO, 509 U.S. at 48 1 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
36. Id. at 584.
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that "the grossly excessive award imposed in this case transcends the
constitutional limit."37
It is important to pause here to make clear the full extent of what the
Court said in BMW. First, the Court affirmed that due process imposes an
excessiveness limitation on punitive damages based on the logic that
awards exceeding an amount needed to further a state's legitimate interests
in punishment and deterrence is arbitrary and therefore violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 38 Second, the Court
indicated that "a State may not impose economic sanctions on violators of
its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other
States," a derivative of the limits on states' sovereignty and notions of
comity.39 Rather, punitive awards imposed by states "must be supported by
the State's interest in protecting its own consumers and its own
economy."40 The Court did find, however, that out-of-state conduct "may
be relevant to the determination of the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct."4 1 Third, the Court stated, "Elementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person
receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose."42 According to the Court, it was this requirement of fair notice
that suggested to it the three guideposts as indicia of whether prospective
tortfeasors would be able to foresee the magnitude of the sanction a state
might impose for their malfeasance. Punitive awards going beyond the
level that the guideposts suggest as foreseeable would be considered
unconstitutionally excessive because defendants would lack adequate
notice that such damages could attach to their conduct.
This Article objects to the first and third of these propositions. The
Court's second point, that a state may not seek to punish conduct that is
lawful elsewhere, is sound because the sovereign authority of states does
not properly extend to the punishment of lawful extraterritorial activity
within the federal system.43 In BMW, however, this principle was not
37. Id. at 585-86.
38. Id. at 568.
39. Id. at 572.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 574 n.21.
42. Id. at 574.
43. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("[N]o State can exercise direct jurisdiction and
authority over persons or property without its territory. The several States are of equal dignity and
authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others." (citations
omitted)).
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implicated because the Alabama Supreme Court previously had shorn the
punitive damages award imposed by the jury of any elements that relied
upon "'acts that occurred in other jurisdictions."'44 Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court did not, and could not, invalidate the award before it on the ground
that it was tainted by reliance on lawful out-of-state conduct. The first and
third propositions-that the Due Process Clause bars excessive awards
because they are arbitrary and fail to provide defendants with adequate
notice of punishment-are the more troublesome aspects of the Court's
excessiveness jurisprudence that this Article challenges.
BMW was not the final word from the Court on these issues. After
BMW, the Court again faced a constitutional challenge to a punitive
damages award in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,
although here it focused on the proper standard of review when considering
the constitutionality of a punitive damages award.45 Stating that "'the level
of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury,"' the Court
held that a de novo standard was appropriate for reviewing punitive awards
imposed by juries.46 In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell, the Court's most recent case in this area, the Court again
invalidated a punitive damages award as excessive under the Due Process
Clause.47 The punitive award was $ 1 45 million coupled with a $ 1 million
compensatory award, a ratio the Court simply could not stomach.48 Indeed,
one of the more important statements made by the Court in State Farm
pertained to its view of the proportionality guidepost: "[I]n practice, few
awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory
damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process."49

Together, these cases-in the name of the Due Process Clause-place
the Court squarely in the position of taking a nondeferential second look at
44. BMW, 517 U.S. at 567 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 628 ( Ala.
1994)). Indeed, because of this fact, Justice Scalia remarked, "The Court's sweeping (and largely
unsupported) statements regarding the relationship of punitive awards to lawful or unlawful out-of-state
conduct are the purest dicta." Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 424 (2001).
46. Id. at 437-43 (quoting Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 459 ( 1996)).
47. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 408 (2003).
48. Id. at 426.
49. Id. at 425.
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state-imposed, and Congressionally imposed,50 punitive damages awards.
The Court has determined for itself whether a defendant's conduct is
sufficiently reprehensible to justify a punitive award of a given amount.
Furthermore, the Court has declared that awards exceeding a single-digit
multiple of compensatory damages are presumptively excessive, placing
substantial downward pressure on punitive awards before they reach the
High Court for review. The next Part of the Article critiques this doctrine.
III. A CRITIQUE
Having held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment5 1 does not apply to punitive damages awards,52 the Court has
determined that the Due Process Clause does apply to such awards and that
it supplies a substantive limitation on the level punitive damages awards
may reach. The sole question for consideration here is whether such a
limitation may properly be found within the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The answer is no. After touching on
some of the familiar criticisms of the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence,
this Part turns to an analysis of the precedential underpinnings of the
Court's doctrine, followed by a consideration of whether the Court's
interpretation of due process is consonant with basic canons of
constitutional construction or with interpretive constraints imposed by the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution.
50. There is nothing in the language of BMW to suggest that the Court's interpretation of due
process is limited to the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, lower courts have since indicated that the due
process principles espoused in BMW equally limit the federal government's ability to impose punitive
damages awards via the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Johnson v. Howard, 24 F. App'x 480, 486 (6th Cir.
2001) ('"Grossly excessive' damages awards are prohibited by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments."); Diviney v. Nationsbank of Tex., N . A., 225 B.R. 762, 777 (B.A.P.
10th Cir. 1998). The Diviney court stated:
We are aware of recent decisions that have imposed some limits on punitive damage awards
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which applies only to the States, but assume those limits might also be
applicable under [ I I U.S.C.] § 362(h) through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which applies to the federal government.
Id. (citations omitted).
5 1 . U.S. CONST. amend. vm.
52. Prior to the Court's holding in Browning-Ferris, many commentators argued that the Eighth
Amendment should be read to apply to punitive damages awards. See, e.g., Gerald W. Boston, Punitive
Damages and the Eighth Amendment: Application of the Excessive Fines Clause, 5 COOLEY L. REV.
667 (1988); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA.
L. REV. 139 (1986); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some
Lessons from History, 40 VAND. L. REV. I 233 (1987); Andrew M. Kenefick, Note, The
Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85
MICH. L. REV. 1699 (1987).
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A. INTERNAL CRITIQUE
The BMW doctrine is riddled with various internal deficiencies: its
intractable subjectivity, its likely adverse impact on states' policies of
retribution and deterrence, and its insistence on de novo review of jury
decisions traditionally entitled to more deferential review. Each of these
internal critiques will be discussed in turn.
1. The Subjective, Takes-the-Judicial-Breath-Away-and-Raises-the
Judicial-Eyebrows Test53
A common criticism of the test created by the Court to evaluate the
excessiveness of punitive damages awards is that the BMW guideposts fail
to provide clear guidance to lower courts as to what level of punitive
damages is appropriate. 54 Justice Scalia's dissent in the case reflected this
sentiment: "In truth, the 'guideposts' mark a road to nowhere; they provide
no real guidance at all."55 Justice Ginsburg was no more charitable in her
assessment of the new guideposts in her BMW dissent: "It has only a vague
concept of substantive due process, a 'raised eyebrow' test as its ultimate
guide."56 This lack of guidance ultimately derives from the fact that the
first two guideposts consist of subjective factors that are not susceptible to
principled application.
The first guidepost-the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct-on its face discloses its subjectivity by its reliance on the concept
of "reprehensibility." Reprehensibility is by its very nature a subjective
concept because it refers to the degree of moral opprobrium that one would
affix to given conduct. Such moral assessments depend heavily on the
views and norms of the assessor and will vary to some extent from one
person to another. Although the Court purported to give additional
guidance regarding the reprehensibility guidepost in BMW and State Farm,
such guidance has failed to infuse the factor with sufficient objectivity:
We have instructed courts to determine the reprehensibility of a
defendant by considering whether: the harm caused was physical as
opposed to economic; the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or
53. This phrase is borrowed from Pamela S. Karlan. Pamela S. Karlan, "Pricking the Lines": The
Due Process Clause, Punitive Damages, and Criminal Punishment, Lecture (Nov. 4, 2003), in 88 MINN.
L. REV. 880, 9 1 1 (2004).
54. Neil B. Stekloff, Note, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive Due Process Review of Punitive
Damages Awards after BMW v. Gore, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1 797, 1 8 1 7 ( 1 997) (arguing that "each
guidepost is far too subjective and malleable to be meaningful beyond the facts of BMW v. Gore").
55. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 5 1 7 U.S. 559, 605 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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a reckless disregard of the health or safety of others; the target of the
conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated
actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the result of
intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident. 57

These considerations are of little help in determining reprehensibility
within the various categories they describe. In other words, this additional
guidance tells a court that wrongdoing causing physical harm is more
reprehensible than economic harm. The guidance does not, however, help a
court distinguish among or weigh various degrees of physical harm to
determine the level of reprehensibility for the purposes of fixing punitive
damages.
A further problem with these considerations is that they involve the
Supreme Court making its own determination on behalf of the entire nation
that conduct with certain characteristics is, al ways and in all circumstances,
more reprehensible than other conduct. For example, the Supreme Court
pronounces that all conduct causing physical harm is more reprehensible
than all conduct causing economic harm. 58 But the nature of the harm as
physical rather than economic will not al ways serve as an adequate proxy
for determining relative degrees of reprehensibility. Wrongdoing causing
physical harm such as cutting someone with a knife or punching a person in
the eye can hardly be deemed more reprehensible than, or as causing the
same degree of damage, as massive securities fraud or other corporate
wrongdoing costing shareholders billions of dollars, their retirement
security, and their jobs.59 Additionally, reprehensibility seems likely to be a
localized judgment that only has meaning with reference to the standards of
a relevant local community. Some states may find that consumer fraud is a
particularly pernicious and harmful offense that plagues its citizens and
costs them millions of dollars annually. Other states may find that
consumer fraud really is not much of a problem, but personal property theft
is. Still other states that serve as major financial centers might find that
they face serious wrongful conduct in the financial and securities area that
57. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW, 5 17
U.S. at 576-77).
58. See BMW, 5 1 7 U.S. at 576.
59. The example of the Enron debacle comes to mind. See The Impact, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/enron/front.html (follow 'The Impact" hyperlink)
(last visited May 17, 2006). The Impact states:
Thousands of Enron employees . . . were left unemployed. Enron encouraged employees to
invest in the company, matched their 40l(k) contributions with company stock, and briefly
froze the plan in late October, barring employee sales, before the stock's final plunge.
Thousands of employees and retirees have next to nothing in their accounts.

Id.
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dwarfs other wrongs in importance and reprehensibility. The point is that it
is not appropriate for the Supreme Court, an unelected and
nonrepresentative federal body, to pronounce and enforce universal,
national standards of reprehensibility binding upon the states.
The second guidepost-the disparity between the actual or potential
harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award-is
subjective on two counts. First, when identifying the magnitude of any
disparity, a court has to assess the degree of potential harm and then
compare it to the punitive award. This is a somewhat discretionary
assessment that is subject to some manipulability.60 How can potential
harm be measured with any degree of precision? What assumptions should
be made? Should judges assume a worst case scenario? Second, once a
disparity is quantified, the guidepost calls for a subjective judgment
regarding whether that disparity is inappropriate under the circumstances of
the case. Is a disparity of 20-to- 1 too great? How is a court to make such a
determination? Although the Court has indicated that punitive-to
corupensatory damages ratios greater than 9-to- 1 will rarely be warranted,61
absent a bright-line rule imposing such a fixed upper limit, lower courts are
left to figure out for themselves whether a given disparity is excessive
without being given any objective standards for doing so.
The ultimate assessment made by the Court in BMW and State
Fann-that the given punitive damages awards were of an amount greater
than that needed to achieve the state's legitimate goals of deterrence and
retribution and greater than that warranted by the reprehensibility of the
defendants' actions-is wholly subjective. 62 There is no objective means of
60. Steven L. Chanenson & John Y. Gotanda, The Foggy Road for Evaluating Punitive
Damages: Lifting the Haze from the BMW/State Farm Guideposts, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 441, 470
(2004). Chanenson and Gotanda state:
For example, the ratio in TXO has been described as being both 526 to I (when considering
the punitive damages award to the actual compensatory damages) and as not more than 10 to
I (when considering the punitive damages award to the potential compensatory damages if
the tortious plan had succeeded). Thus, the reliability and usefulness of the second guidepost
is questionable.
Id. (footnote omitted).
6 1 . See State Farm, 538 U.S. at 425.
62. One scholar, in defending the holding of BMW, attempted to explain why BMW's actions
were not sufficiently egregious to warrant the resulting punitive award, but ultimately did nothing more
than convey his personal view that the wrong done was slight. See Zipursky, supra note 26, at 168-69.
Zipursky states:
[I]t seems to me . . . that Gore did not really have a particularly serious grievance against
BMW . . . . [I]n light of the relatively minor fraudulent concealment, the grievance
legitimately held against BMW by Gore is quite paltry . . . . [I]t is preposterous that the
grievance associated with this transaction was anywhere near the size that a jury would have
believed warranted personal redress of $2 million.

2006]

DUE PROCESS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

1 099

determining whether a lower award would indeed achieve the same level of
deterrence as the award actually imposed. Similarly, whether a state's goals
of punishment or retribution are vindicated by a lower amount is not an
objective matter. Indeed, by imposing and approving a higher award the
state has already indicated its view that a lower award would not
sufficiently further its interest in retribution. Thus, the difference of awards
is no more than a subjective difference of opinion, but the Court has the
power to have its view control.63 This sad state of affairs makes Justice
Scalia's comment in his BMW dissent quite apt: "[T]he application of the
Court's new rule of constitution'": law is constrained by no principle other
than the Justices' subjective assessment of the 'reasonableness' of the
award in relation to the conduct for which it was assessed."64 With
subjective assessments holding sway over the Court's BMW analysis, the
Court has created a constitutional law of punitive damages that brings
about the very arbitrariness that the Court has sought to combat. As Justice
Scalia recently remarked in another context, "a test . . . that has no
demonstrable basis in the text of the Constitution and cannot objectively be
shown to have been met or failed" is no more than "a standing invitation to
judicial arbitrariness and policy-driven decisionmaking."65 Thus, beyond
being ill-founded and constitutionally untenable (defects of the doctrine to
be addressed below), the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence is subjective
to the point of rendering federal punitive damages review arbitrary and
unpredictable.
2. The Problem with Proportionality
The Court's recourse to a proportionality principle as a means of
assessing the excessiveness of punitive damages awards is additionally
problematic because the magnitude of harm inflicted on plaintiffs is not the
Id. (emphasis added). Well, that is just one man's opinion. Clearly the jury and state judiciary in BMW
felt differently and the question is the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court to second-guess that
judgment.
63. Scalia acknowledged as much in a different context when he rejected a constitutional
proportionality principle for reviewing criminal sentences under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. See Harrnelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 958, 986 (1991) (plurality
opinion). Justice Scalia states:
Toe real function of a constitutional proportionality principle, if it exists, is to enable judges
to evaluate a penalty that some assemblage of men and women has considered
proportionate-and to say that it is not. For that real-world enterprise, the standards seem so
inadequate that the proportionality principle becomes an invitation to imposition of subjective
values.
Id.
64. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 5 I 7 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 557-58 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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proper measure of the reprehensibility of a wrongdoer' s actions. There is
no clear reason why the magnitude of actual or potential harm bears the
most relevance to the reprehensibility of conduct; the degree of harm
caused or potentially caused can depend on a host of factors having nothing
to do with reprehensibility. For example, the preexisting condition of a
victim can affect whether a given act inflicts minor harm or major damage;
unpredictable market forces can determine whether securities fraud results
in huge profits or major losses for investors; insurance coverage can reduce
the harm one suffers compared with harm that is not mitigated by such
coverage; acts of God such as severe weather can bring about more harmful
consequences than the same conduct may have caused under better
conditions; or simple chance events can mean the difference between a
minor car accident and a fatal one. Further, as one commentator has noted,
quite reprehensible actions can have minimal harmful effects, while wholly
accidental conduct can lead to disastrous results, further attenuating the
connection between resultant harm and reprehensibility:
[l]f the purpose of punitive damages is to deter behavior that is morally
reprehensible, the relevance of the compensatory loss is not immediately
evident unless an intent to affect the magnitude of loss was a specific
element of the reprehensible action. Many totally inadvertent or
accidental actions generate huge loss; many repugnant and reprehensible
actions generate little harm, measured solely in compensatory terms of
lost income, needed expense, and pain and suffering. 66

When evaluating punitive damages, what matters more than the
magnitude of the harm to the plaintiff is the level of insult to the public.
Punitive damages represent the imposition of a penalty by the state against
wrongdoers in an effort to express the community's level of disapproval of
the unlawful conduct and to punish the wrongdoer accordingly. 67 Thus, the
proper measure of punitive damages awards is this level of public
outrage-which can only properly be pronounced by state legislatures and
civil juries-not the degree of private harm. Indeed, the Court long ago
recognized that punitive damages are not properly measured by their
proportion to the degree of harm inflicted on the victim when it wrote:
Nor does giving the penalty to the aggrieved [party] require that it be
confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed as a
punishment for the violation of a public law, the Legislature may adjust
66.
(1996).
67.

George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case ofAlabama, 56 LA. L. REv. 825, 838
See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66 (1919).
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its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just as if it
were going to the state. 68

Because it is the public wrong rather than private injury that is being
punished, there is no good reason to exalt proportionality to compensatory
damages as the principal measuring rod of excessiveness.
Beyond being an inappropriate yardstick of reprehensibility, the
Court's proportionality principle detracts from the legitimate goals of
punishment and deterrence that the Court has indicated states have a right
to pursue.69 A strict proportionality principle-particularly one biased
against awards exceeding single-digit multiples-can result in punitive
awards too meager in size to deter well-heeled prospective tortfeasors from
engaging in similar wrongdoing. An insufficiently substantial penalty will
be viewed simply as a tolerable cost of a certain course of action, provided
the ultimate benefits to be gained outweigh that cost.70 Two commentators
have expressed this point in economic terms :
The magnitude of the effect on the firm's production activities and its
choice of inputs necessarily depend on the firm's production budget and
financial status of the firm[;] the wealthier the firm or greater its ability
to pay, the smaller the effect. Accordingly, one of the dominant factors
any court should consider when reviewing the award of punitive
damages is the financial position of the firm, i.e. its isocost function (or
production cost budget). The extent to which a firm is "willing to pay"
the punitive price for reprehensible production activities is a function of
the firm's [utility] and [budget] functions. To ignore these individual
specific functional relationships renders the stated purposes of punitive
damages, i.e. punishment and deterrence, meaningless.71

68. Id.
When the penalty is contrasted with the overcharge possible in any instance it of course seems
large, but, as we have said, its validity is not to be tested in that way. When it is considered
with due regard for the interests of the public, . . . we think it properly cannot be said to be so
severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously
unreasonable.
Id. at 67.
69. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568 ("Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further a State's
legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.").
70. Laura J. Hines, Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won 't Be the
Last Word, 37 AKRON L. REV. 779, 808 (2004) ("An amount that might be sufficient to deter a less
wealthy defendant could very well be written off as simply a cost of doing business by a much
wealthier corporation, undermining the achievement of the deterrence goals of punitive damages.").
71. Kevin S. Marshall & Patrick Fitzgerald, Punitive Damages and the Supreme Court's
Reasonable Relationship Test: Ignoring the Economics of Deterrence, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL
COMMENT. 237, 256 (2005).
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Economic realities mean that punitive damages must take into account the
wealth of the defendant if states are to have any hope of achieving their
retribution and deterrence goals when dealing with defendants of greater
means. 72
Referring to the tortfeasor's financial position in fixing punitive
damages is not a foreign concept to the Court. Prior to BMW and State
Farm the Court had endorsed the proposition that a defendant's wealth
properly figured into an evaluation of the propriety of a punitive damages
award.7 3 The strict proportionality principle announced by the Court,
however, does not account for the need to tailor punitive damages to the
financial condition of the defendant (and prospective wrongdoers) to
achieve the desired level of punishment and deterrence. Thus, the Court's
move toward requiring a reasonable relationship between punitive damages
and compensatory damages undermines the intended purpose of punitive
damages.
3. Unjustified De Novo Review
A final point worth mentioning is that the Court's determination that
its excessiveness review must be conducted de novo74 permits the complete
second-guessing of factual determinations made by the jury. Justice Scalia
pointed out that the Court was already doing this in BMW:
The Court distinguishes today's result from Haslip and TXO partly on
the ground that "the record in this case discloses no deliberate false
statements, acts of affirmative misconduct, or concealment of evidence

7 2. Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig usefully provided a historical perspective on this point,
highlighting the ancient Roman practice of exemplary damages and its justification:
The Roman Jaw of multiple damages blended compensation with punishment. The Twelve
Tables dating from 450 B .C. contained numerous examples of multiple damages. One
commentator noted the need for Roman multiple damages to constrain wealthy elites:
''The Jaws of the XII Tables declared that whoever should do a personal injury to another
should pay twenty-five [asses], a considerable sum at the time. At a later [period], however,
when money abounded, this penalty became so insignificant that one Lucius Veratius used to
amuse himself by striking those whom he met in the streets in the face, and then tendering
them the legal amends, from a wallet which a slave carried after him for the purpose."
Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity ofPunitive Damages Awards: Reforming
the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285-86 (1993) (quoting Vindictive Damages, 4 AM. LJ.
61, 7 5 (1852) (footnotes omitted) (brackets reflect alterations from original source that were not noted
in Historical Continuity)).
73. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 462 (1993) (plurality
opinion) ("The punitive damages award in this case is certainly large, but in light of . . . petitioner's
wealth, we are not persuaded that the award was so 'grossly excessive' as to be beyond the power of the
State to allow." (footnote omitted)); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 , 21-22 (1991)
(approving the use of the defendant's "financial position" as one criterion in determining whether a
punitive award is excessive).
7 4. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 (200 1).
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of improper motive, such as were present in Haslip and TXO." This
seemingly rejects the findings necessarily made by the jury-that
petitioner had committed a fraud that was "gross, oppressive, or
malicious."75

Reaching the conclusion that the facts do not support malevolence on the
part of the defendant, after the jury has considered the evidence and
reached a contrary conclusion, improperly permits the Supreme Court to
weigh the evidence and reexamine factual determinations; this conclusion
violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Seventh Amendment. 76
Additionally, de novo review not only invades the traditional province
of civil juries but also invades the traditional province of the states. As
discussed in greater detail below, the power to appropriate levels of
punishment for violations of state laws is delegated to the states, not to the
national government. The Court seemed to affirm this notion in State Farm
when it wrote, "[E]ach State alone can determine what measure of
punishment, if any, to impose on a defendant who acts within its
jurisdiction."77 It is unclear, however, how de novo review of factual
determinations made by juries respects state authority in this area when it
allows the Court to substitute its own measure of punishment for that of the
states.78
In sum, the Court's excessiveness review-which consists of a de
novo review using the BMW guideposts, heavily shaped by a single-digit
multiple proportionality requirement-is fraught with hopeless subjectivity,
is poorly connected to the goals of punishment and deterrence, and enables
the Court to engage in unwarranted review of factual judgments made by
state courts and juries. In the sections that follow, this Article explores the
deeper doctrinal difficulties with the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence
that go beyond the internal problems discussed above.
75. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 606 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting the
opinion of the Court at 579 and ALA. CODE § 6-11-2O(b)( l ) (1993)) (citations omitted).
76. The Seventh Amendment provides, "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall
be othenvise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common
law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII (emphasis added).
77. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
78. BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (''There is no precedential warrant for giving
our judgment priority over the judgment of state courts and juries on this matter.").
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B . AN ABSENCE OF PRECEDENT

More serious than the doctrine's shortcomings from a policy
perspective is the fact that the Supreme Court lacked any precedential basis
for its determination in TXO and BMW that the Due Process Clause
imposes substantive limitations on punitive damages awards. Although the
Court has considerable authority to declare the meaning of constitutional
provisions, it has presented its due process excessiveness jurisprudence as
if it were firmly and deeply rooted in prior case law.79 This, however, is
simply not the case. Scrutiny of the collection of cases on which the Court
has purported to base its doctrine reveals a total absence of precedential
support for the notion of due process limitations on the amount of punitive
damages that states may impose. Indeed, such a review makes plain that the
Court's position is not the product of reason and sound constitutional
analysis, but rather is a modem creation falsely clothed in the cover of
precedent.
1. Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw80
The road to BMW was short, spanning less than a decade. In just that
brief period, however, the Court was able to spin out of thin air an entire
jurisprudence of excessiveness-based on the Due Process Clause-and
present it as if it had always been there. In no case prior to 1 988 did any
member of the Court express through an opinion the idea that due process
placed substantive limits on the amount of punitive damages. In that year,
however, in Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, the Court faced a
challenge to a punitive damages award based on the Due Process Clause.81
Although the Court rejected the challenge because it had not been raised
79. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453-54 (1993) (plurality
opinion).
[S]everal of our opinions have stated that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes substantive limits "beyond which penalties may not go." Seaboard Air
Llne Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78, 28 S. Ct. 28, 30, 52 L.Ed. 108 (1907). See also St.
Louis, I.M. & S.R. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 6�7. 40 S. Ct. 7 1 , 73, 64 L.Ed. 139
(1919); Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270, 286, 32 S. Ct. 406, 41 I , 56 L.Ed.
760 (1912). Moreover, in Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S.
482, 35 S. Ct. 886, 59 L.Ed. 1419 (1915), the Court actually set aside a penalty imposed on a
telephone company on the ground that it was so "plainly arbitrary and oppressive" as to
violate the Due Process Clause. Id., at 491 , 35 S. Ct., at 888. In an earlier case the Court had
stated that it would not review state action fixing the penalties for unlawful conduct unless
"the fines imposed are so grossly excessive as to amount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law." Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. I), 212 U.S. 86, 1 1 I , 29 S. Ct. 220,
227, 53 L.Ed. 417 ( 1909).
Id.
80. Bankers Llfe & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
8 1 . Id. at 75-76.

2006]

DUE PROCESS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES

1 105

and considered in the lower courts,82 Justice O'Connor seized the
opportunity to pen a concurrence that laid the groundwork for the Court's
ultimate embrace of substantive due process limitations on punitive
damages awards. 83
Justice O'Connor's principal concern was the authority of juries under
the Mississippi law at issue "to award any amount of punitive damages in
any tort case in which a defendant acts with a certain mental state."84 She
noted, "Punitive damages are not measured against actual injury, so there is
no objective standard that limits their amount."85 Because of the lack of
any objective constraints, she worried that '"the impact of these windfall
recoveries is unpredictable and potentially substantial. "'86 For that reason,
she wrote, "the Court should scrutinize carefully the procedures under
which punitive damages are awarded in civil lawsuits."87 Because under
the Mississippi law "the amount of the penalty that may ensue is left
completely indeterminate," and, according to the Mississippi Supreme
Court, " 'the determination of the amount of punitive damages is a matter
committed solely to the authority and discretion of the jury, "' Justice
O'Connor mused, "This grant of wholly standardless discretion to
determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent with due
process."88
Although Justice O'Connor's suggestion that "the procedures under
which punitive damages are awarded"89 deserved scrutiny is certainly
correct, her further suggestion that the jury's unfettered discretion in setting
the amount of such awards "appears"90 contrary to due process is off the
mark. One finds no citations in support of Justice O'Connor's claim
regarding the purported affront to due process worked by such jury
discretion because no Supreme Court precedent supports such a view. To
the contrary, as an analysis of all the relevant cases below demonstrates,
the Court had historically and continually affirmed jury discretion in this
area without ever suggesting any due process limits on the amounts that
juries could award.
82. Id. at 76 ("We conclude, however, that these claims were not raised and passed upon in state
court, and wc decline to reach them here.").
83. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
84. Id. at 87.
85. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Int') Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50 (1979)).
87. Id. at 88.
88. Id. (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 278 (Miss. 1985)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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2. Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, lnc.91
The next case in which the Court faced a due process challenge to a
punitive damages award was Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont, Inc.
v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. ,92 where the Court again declined to consider the
issue because it was not properly preserved.93 In doing so, Justice
Blackmun, the author of the majority opinion, did take the opportunity to
note that the question was one the Court had never addressed:
There is some authority in our opinions for the view that the Due Process
Clause places outer limits on the size of a civil damages award made
pursuant to a statutory scheme, see, e.g., St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v.
Williams, 25 1 U.S. 63, 66-67 ( 1 919), but we have never addressed the
precise question presented here: whether due process acts as a check on
undue jury discretion to award punitive damages in the absence of any
express statutory limit. 94

But Justice Blackmun declined to opine on the matter and simply wrote,
''That inquiry must await another day."95 The award was also challenged as
excessive under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, but
the Court held the clause to be inapplicable to punitive damages awards.96
Unfortunately, other justices of the Court were not so reticent. In a
concurrence, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, took the
opportunity to promote his view that the Due Process Clause does impose
substantive limits on the amount of punitive damages a jury may award.97
Unlike Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Bankers Life, however, Justice
Brennan attempted to support his view with precedent stretching back to
the tum of the last century:
Several of our decisions indicate that even where a statute sets a range of
possible civil damages that may be awarded to a private litigant, the Due
Process Clause forbids damages awards that are "grossly excessive,"
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 2 1 2 U.S. 86, 1 1 1 (1909), or "so severe
and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and
obviously unreasonable," St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Williams, 25 1
U.S. 63, 66-67 ( 1 9 1 9). See also Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Browning-Ferris Indus. o f Vt., Inc. v . Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 259-60.
Id. at 280-8 1 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482, 491 (1915); Missouri Pacific R. Co. v.
Humes, 1 1 5 U.S. 5 1 2, 522-523 (1885).98

Ultimately, Justice Brennan's effort to gin up a pedigree for his proposition
fails upon scrutiny of his citations. Waters-Pierce provides no support for
the proposition that due process forbids "grossly excessive" punitive
damages awards because it was a case addressing the propriety of a civil
penalty referred to as a "fine" by the Court, not punitive damages. 99
Furthermore, the case that the Waters-Pierce Court cites in support of its
"grossly excessive" language, Coffey v. County of Harlan, also was
addressing the propriety of a criminal fine and a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to it based on a claim of having been deprived an opportunity to
be heard, not based on the fine being excessive. 100
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Williams, the

next case cited by Justice Brennan, addressed a civil penalty, rather than
punitive damages, as well; in this case, however, the penalty was made
payable to the aggrieved private party rather than to the state. 101 Although
such an arrangement renders the payment akin to punitive damages, the
Williams Court wrote, ''The provision assailed is essentially penal" and
"'[t]he power of the State to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its
statutory requirements is coeval with government. "'102 Having styled the
penalty as penal, the Court indicated the following relationship between the
Fourteenth Amendment and a state's power to impose penal sanctions:
That [the Due Process Clause] places a limitation upon the power of the
States to prescribe penalties for violations of their laws has been fully
recognized, but always with the express or tacit qualification that the
states still possess a wide latitude of discretion in the matter and that
their enactments transcend the limitation only where the penalty
prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to
the offense and obviously unreasonable. Coffey v. Harlan County, 204
U.S. 659, 662 (1907] ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78
98.

Id.

99. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1), 212 U.S. 86, 96, 1 1 1 (1909) (noting that the
underlying action was a prosecution "brought by the Attorney General of Texas and the county attorney
of Travis county, to recover penalties, under [an 1899 state anti-trust lawl . . . at the rate of $5,000 per
day, and under [a separate 1903 state anti-trust law] . . . at the rate of $50 per day").
100. Coffey v. County of Harlan, 204 U.S. 659, 663 (1907) ('The plaintiff contends that the
sentence awarded against Whitney violated this prohibition, in that Whitney had no opportunity to be
heard upon and defend against that part of the sentence which imposed a fine and authorized a judgment
against his estate for its collection.").
1 0 1 . St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S . Ry. Co. v . Williams, 251 U . S . 63, 6 6 (1919).
102. Id. (quoting Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 1 15 U.S. 512, 523 (1885)) (brackets reflect
alterations from original source that were not noted in Williams).
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[ 1 907]; Waters-pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 2 1 2 U.S. 86, 1 1 l [1909]; Collins
v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 5 10 [ 1 9 15] .103

Clearly, given the Court's determination in Williams that the penalty at
issue was penal, the Court here is referring to limits on penal sanctions
imposed by states, something today's Court would view as deriving from
the protections of the Eighth Amendment as incorporated against the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
That the Williams Court is discussing limits on criminal penalties is
confirmed when one consults the sources cited by the Court. Coffey and
Waters-Pierce were criminal and civil fine cases, 104 Collins was a case
dealing with a criminal sentence of imprisonment,105 and Seaboard dealt
with a civil penalty similar to that at issue in Williams.106 Thus, Williams
should be seen as an excessive fines case rather than a punitive damages
case.
Moving to the third in Justice Brennan's series of citations,
Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Danaher 107 hardly provides
the "see also" support that Justice Brennan advertises.108 In Danaher, the
defendant telephone company was held liable for $6,300 in civil penalties
as a result of failing to provide service to a customer in violation of a state
statute mandating the delivery of service. 109 The telephone company
challenged the penalty because they were denying service pursuant to an
impartially enforced regulation that denied service to all customers with
delinquencies, a regulation that state law arguably permitted the company
to impose. 110 In assessing the challenge to the civil penalty, the Court wrote
as follows:
103. Id. at 66--67.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
1 05. Collins v. Johnston, 237 U.S. 502, 509 (19 1 5) ("It is contended that a sentence of fourteen
years' imprisonment for the crime of perjury is grossly excessive, and therefore illegal, and prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.").
106. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1907). The Court states:
The question in this case is the constitutionality of section 2 of an act of the State of South
Carolina, approved February 23, 1903 (24 Stat. 81), which reads: . . . . "Failure to adjust and
pay such claim within the periods respectively herein prescribed shall subject each common
carrier so failing to a penalty of $50 for each and every such failure, to be recovered by any
consignee or consignees aggrieved, in any court of competent jurisdiction."
Id. (citation omitted for the internal quotation).
107. Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
1 08. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 28 1 (1989)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
109. Danaher, 238 U.S. at 487-88.
1 1 0. Id. at 486-88.
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There was no intentional wrongdoing, no departure from any prescribed
or known standard of action, and no reckless conduct. Some regulation
establishing a mode of inducing prompt payment of the monthly rentals
was necessary . . . . The protection of its own revenues and justice to its
paying patrons required that something be done. It acted by adopting the
regulation and then impartially enforcing it. There was no mode of
judicially testing the regulation's reasonableness in advance of acting
under it, and, as we have seen, it had the support of repeated
adjudications in other jurisdictions. In these circumstances to inflict upon
the company penalties aggregating $6,300 was so plainly arbitrary and
oppressive as to be nothing short of a taking of its property without due
process of law. 1 11

Danaher does not support the notion that the Due Process Clause
imposes substantive limits on the amount of punitive damages states may
award. Rather, the case holds that it is "arbitrary and oppressive" to impose
civil penalties on a company that has not engaged in intentional
wrongdoing or reckless conduct but has instead acted in a way that it had
reason to believe was permissible. 112
Justice Brennan's final case, Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes,
offers the least support for the claim that due process limits the amount of
punitive damages. 1 1 3 In Humes, Justice Field contradicts that claim when
he writes:
"The law," says Sedgwick, in his excellent treatise on Damages,
"permits the jury to give what it terms punitory, vindictive, or exemplary
damages; in other words, blends together the interests of society and of
the aggrieved individual, and gives damages, not only to recompense the
sufferer, but [also] to punish the offender." The discretion of the jury in
such cases is not controlled by any very definite rules. 114

Justice Field actually confirms that jury discretion in this area is

unconstrained, the opposite of what Justice Brennan is asserting. Further,

earlier in his opinion, Justice Field stated that the Due Process Clause
affords no vehicle for challenging "the harshness, injustice, and oppressive
character" of laws provided that they are enacted "within the legitimate
sphere of [the state's] power" and enforced consistent with certain
procedural protections.115 Thus, Humes can hardly be used to support the
l lI.
112.
l l 3.
114.
1 1 5.

Id. at 490-9 I .
Id.

Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512 (I 885).
Id. at 521 (citation omitted for internal quotation).
Id. at 520. The Court stated:
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idea that the Due Process Clause prohibits "excessive" punitive damages
awards.
Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion in Browning-Ferris in which she
dissented from the Court's holding that the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to punitive damages awards.116 Before
providing her analysis of the Eighth Amendment issue, however, Justice
O'Connor reiterated her views expressed in Bankers Life, 1 11 and took time
to make several observations about the harmful effects escalating punitive
damages were having on the national economy:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade
ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate
court in a products liability case was $250,000. Since then, awards more
than 30 times as high have been sustained on appeal. The threat of such
enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and
development of new products. Some manufacturers of prescription
drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain
liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market.
Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been forced to
abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of
punitive damages. 118

As will be discussed further below, 119 these policy concerns are more
appropriate for legislative consideration and have no bearing on the
existence of constitutional limitations on punitive damages awards. These
concerns, however, ultimately seem to be what compelled the Court to
embrace such limits in BMW.
Beyond sowing seeds of discontent through her litany of policy
concerns, Justice O'Connor's opinion was also pivotal in the pre-BMW line
of cases because her discussion of how she would apply the Excessive
Fines Clause to a review of punitive damages awards reveals the source of
the three guideposts the Court ultimately adopted. The following passage,
in which Justice O'Connor suggests a framework for evaluating punitive

Id.

If the laws enacted by a state be within the legitimate sphere of legislative power, and their
enforcement be attended with the observance of those general rules which our system of
jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights, the harshness, injustice, and
oppressive character of such laws will not invalidate them as affecting life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.

116. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 283 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
117. See supra Part III.B. l .
118. Browning-Fer ris, 492 U.S. at 282 (citations omitted).
119. See infra Part III.C.2.
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damages awards under the Eighth Amendment, is remarkable for the
degree to which it prefigures the guideposts analysis the Court announces
in BMW:
Determining whether a particular award of punitive damages is excessive
is not an easy task. The proportionality framework that the Court has
adopted under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, however,
offers some broad guidelines. See Solem, 463 U.S., at 290-292. Cf
United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 141 5 (CA9 1987) (applying
Solem factors to civil forfeiture under RICO). I would adapt the Solem
framework to punitive damages in the following manner. First, the
reviewing court must accord "substantial deference" to legislative
judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.
Second, the court should examine the gravity of the defendant' s conduct
and the harshness of the award of punitive damages. Third, because
punitive damages are penal in nature, the court should compare the civil
and criminal penalties imposed in the same jurisdiction for different
types of conduct, and the civil and criminal penalties imposed by
different jurisdictions for the same or similar conduct. 120
It is apparent that the BMW guideposts-which assess the
reprehensibility of the defendant' s misconduct, the proportional
relationship between harm and the punitive award, "and the difference
between [the punitive damages awarded by the jury] and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases" 121 -derive much of their
content from this adaptation of the Solem framework. 122
In sum, in Browning-Ferris, members of the Court alluded to a vague
notion that due process substantively limits punitive damages awards, but
they each failed to identify any precedent that truly stands for that
principle.
3 . Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip 1 23
Two years after Browning-Ferris, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Co. v. Haslip, the Court revisited the issue of whether the Due Process
Clause imposes limitations on the amount of punitive damages. 124 In
Haslip, Justice Blackrnun, author of the Browning-Ferris opinion, further
laid the groundwork for the BMW decision when he listed a catalogue of
120.
121.
1 22.
123.
1 24.

Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 300-01.

BMW ofN. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983).
Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I (1991).

Id. at ?.
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cases that he claimed evinced the Court's awareness of, and ultimate
concern about, the potential constitutional infirmities of excessive punitive
awards. 125 Although Justice Blackmun concludes, in light of the cases he
cites, that "[t]he constitutional status of punitive damages, therefore, is not
an issue that is new to this Court or unanticipated by it," 126 reference to the
cited cases reveals that the constitutional status of punitive damages was
raised in none of them. The first of these cases, City of Newport v. Fact
Concerts, Inc., simply held that punitive damages were not recoverable
against a municipality in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit. 127 In the process of
arriving at that conclusion, the Court had the following to say about
punitive damages:
The Court has remarked elsewhere on the broad discretion traditionally
accorded to juries in assessing the amount of punitive damages. Because
evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is traditionally admissible as a measure
of the amount of punitive damages that should be awarded, the unlimited
taxing power of a municipality may have a prejudicial impact on the
jury, in effect encouraging it to impose a sizable award. The impact of
such a windfall recovery is likely to be both unpredictable and, at times,
substantial, and we are sensitive to the possible strain on local treasuries
and therefore on services available to the public at large. Absent a
compelling reason for approving such an award, not present here, we
deem it unwise to inflict the risk. 128

This passage, which is the one cited by Justice Blackmun, hardly
raises any issue pertaining to the constitutional status of punitive damages.
To the contrary, the Court here affirms that juries have "broad
discretion . . . in assessing the amount of punitive damages" and thus
acknowledges that a punitive award could be both "unpredictable" and
"substantial." No judicial eyebrow is raised here nor is there any hint that
such jury authority is improper.
Justice Blackmun's next case, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. Foust, held that punitive damages "may not be assessed against
a union that breaches its duty of fair representation by failing properly to
125. See id. at 12 (citing: City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981);
lnt'I Bhd. ofElec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-5 1 (1979); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 350 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-84, (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 25 1 U.S. 63, 67 (1919); Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 351 (1913)).
126. Id.
127. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 271 . Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) allows tortious recovery for
individuals deprived of constitutional rights by others acting under color of state law but provides
immunity to judicial officers. Id.
I 28. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S. at 270-7 1 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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pursue a grievance."129 In explaining its rationale, the Court made no
allusions to constitutional concerns with punitive damages. Rather, the
Court relied upon the established fact that punitive damages could be
unforeseeably large to reach its holding that as a policy matter, allowing
unions in such situations to face punitive damages was unwise:
Just as unlimited access to the grievance process could undermine
collective bargaining, so too the threat of punitive damages could disrupt
the responsible decisionmaking essential to peaceful labor relations. In
order to protect against a future punitive award of unforeseeable
magnitude, unions might feel compelled to process frivolous claims or
resist fair settlements. Indeed, even those unions confident that most
juries would hold in their favor could be deterred by the possibility of
punitive damages from taking actions clearly in the interest of union
members. Absent clear congressional guidance, we decline to inject such
an element of uncertainty into union decisions regarding their
representative functions.130

Again, the case here acknowledges the "unforeseeable magnitude" of
punitive awards without condemning them or suggesting that any
condemnation is warranted.
The next case in Justice Blackmun's string of citations is Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., a case that, just like those discussed above, affirms
rather than challenges the authority of juries to award substantial punitive
damages without substantive constitutional constraints. 1 3 1 In Gertz, the
Court held that States may not permit recovery of punitive damages from
publishers or broadcasters for libel or slander when liability is not based on
the showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.132
Justice Blackmun's quotation from the case comes from the following
passage:
We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive damages
against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-defined
standards of liability for defamation. In most jurisdictions jury discretion
over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule that they not
be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive damages in wholly
unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to the actual harm
caused. And they remain free to use their discretion selectively to punish
expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine of presumed damages,
jury discretion to award punitive damages unnecessarily exacerbates the
129.
1 30.
13I.
1 32.

Int'/ Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 442 U.S. at 52.

Id. at 5 1 -52.

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 4 1 8 U.S. 323, 350 (I 974).

Id. at 349-50.
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danger of media self-censorship, but, unlike the former rule, punitive
damages are wholly irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a
negligence standard for private defamation actions. They are not
compensation for injury. Instead, they are private fines levied by civil
juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence.
In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a
less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may
recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual
injury. 133

Certainly, this language admits of no belief or suggestion that substantive
constitutional limits on punitive damages exist. Indeed, as in the cases
discussed above, the Court remarks on the discretion of juries in the area of
punitive damages as an established and uncontroversial fact, not as a
circumstance potentially at odds with the Court's constitutional
sensibilities.
Next in Justice Blackmun's list of citations was a dissent by Justice
Marshall in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 1 34 Justice Marshall expresses
his concern about the impact on freedom of the press by permitting
punitive damages awards to be imposed against media defendants alleged
to have committed defamation as follows:
The concept of punitive or exemplary damages was first articulated in
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K. B. 1763)-one of
the general warrant cases. There Lord Camden found that the power to
award such damages was inherent in the jury's exercise of uncontrolled
discretion in the awarding of damages. Today these damages are
rationalized as a way to punish the wrongdoer and to admonish others
not to err. Thus they serve the same function as criminal penalties and
are in effect private fines. Unlike criminal penalties, however, punitive
damages are not awarded within discernible limits but can be awarded in
almost any amount. Since there is not even an attempt to offset any
palpable loss and since these damages are the direct product of the
ancient theory of unlimited jury discretion, the only limit placed on the
j ury in awarding punitive damages is that the damages not be
"excessive," and in some j urisdictions, that they bear some relationship
to the amount of compensatory damages awarded. The manner in which
unlimited discretion may be exercised is plainly unpredictable. And fear
of the extensive awards that may be given under the doctrine must
133.
134.

Id. at 350.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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necessarily produce the impingement on freedom of the press recognized
in New York Times. 1 35

Justice Marshall here makes no mention of constitutional limits on
punitive damages. Rather, he affirms the longstanding view that jury
discretion in this area is "unlimited" and that punitive damages "can be
awarded in almost any amount." 1 36 There is no indication that the limit
against excessiveness he mentions is rooted in federal constitutional
principles, but is most likely a reference to the limits traditionally imposed
by the states themselves.
The remaining cases in Justice Blackmun's list are equally unavailing.
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Tucker addresses a fixed civil penalty
imposed on common carriers for charging fees in excess of statutorily
prescribed amounts,1 37 not the authority of juries to impose punitive or
exemplary damages upon tortfeasors. Thus, although the Court struck down
the award as "arbitrary and oppressive," it was deemed "arbitrary" because
its predetermined and fixed amount ($500) had nothing to do with the
actual overage in any particular case, and "oppressive" because the pricing
regime penalized carriers for violating a price structure they otherwise had
no prior opportunity to contest. 138 Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone
Co. v. Danaher, 1 39 and St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v.
Williams, 1 4-0 the final cases suggested by Justice Blackmun, have already
been discussed above and, as shown, provide no indication that substantive
constitutional limitations constrain punitive damages awards. 141
Having introduced the Court' s "experience" with this issue by
reference to the cases just reviewed, Justice Blackmun in Haslip declares,
"One must concede that unlimited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial
discretion for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages may invite
extreme results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities."142 Only Waters
Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. 1 ) 143 is cited for this proposition, a case
already shown to address civil fines, not punitive damage awards. 1 44
1 35. Id. at 82-83 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations and footnote omitted).
1 36. Id.
1 37. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 341 ( 1 9 13).
1 38. Id. at 348-5 1 .
1 39. Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915).
1 40. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 25 1 U.S. 63 (1919).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 101-I 2.
1 42. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 18 (1991) (citing Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v,
Texas (No. 1 ), 2 1 2 U.S. 86, 1 1 1 (I 909)).
1 43. Waters-Pierce, 2 1 2 U.S. at 86.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.

1 1 16

SOUTHERN CAUFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79: 1085

Fortunately, Justice Blackmun largely confined his constitutional thoughts
to a concern with whether the procedures for imposing punitive damages
under the Alabama statute at issue sufficiently guided juror discretion,
rather than with whether the amount that the j ury awarded was
excessive. 145 Unfortunately, however, at the end of his opinion, Justice
Blackmun referred to the fact that the punitive award was "4 times the
amount of compensatory damages" and suggested that such an award was
"close to the line" but did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional
impropriety."146 The line that Justice Blackmun alludes to is of his own
invention; he cites no authority for the concept nor does any authority
earlier in the opinion suggest the existence of such a line. Nonetheless, this
line is one of the seeds of the BMW/State Farm doctrine. 147
4. TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. 148
By the time the Court decided the next in the line of cases leading up
to BMW, 'JXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp. , a majority of
justices had signed on to the proposition that due process imposes levels
"'beyond which [punitive damages] may not go. "' 149 Justice Stevens, in an
opinion commanding the support of three other justices, asserted that
"' grossly excessive "' punitive damages awards "'amount to a deprivation
of property without due process of law. "'150 Waters-Pierce, 1 5 1 which in
turn cites Coffey v. Harlan County, 152 was again cited for support just as in
the earlier cases. As should be clear by now, neither Waters-Pierce nor
Coffey in any way make or support the claim that the Due Process Clause
prohibits "grossly excessive" punitive damages awards as they only involve
criminal fines.
145. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 19-23.
146. Id. at 23-24.
147. Although Justice O'Connor wrote a dissent in Haslip, it was on the basis of her belief that the
procedures of the Alabama statute at issue were insufficient because they gave the jury only vague
guidance for the exercise of its discretion: "Alabama's common-law scheme for awarding punitive
damages provides a jury with 'such skeletal guidance' that it invites-even requires-arbitrary results."
Id. at 42-43, 63 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 28 1 (1989)). Her prior arguments regarding substantive upper limits were
not featured; rather, her dissent highlighted void for vagueness arguments and an argument under
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Haslip, 499 U.S. at 53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). For the
Mathews test, see infra note 166.
1 48. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
1 49. Id. at 453-54 (quoting Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 78 (1907)).
1 50. Id. at 454 (quoting Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas (No. I ), 212 U.S. 86, 1 1 1 (1909)).
1 5 1 . Waters-Pierce, 2 1 2 U.S. at 1 1 1 .
1 52. Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U.S. 659 (1907).
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Beyond Waters-Pierce, Justice Stevens cites several other cases to
support the notion of substantive limitations on punitive damages awards.
These cases are unavailing, however, because they are basically the same
cases cited hy advocates of this view in the earlier pre-BMW cases just
discussed. For example, Justice Stevens cites Seaboard Air Line Railway v.
Seegers, which dealt with a fifty-dollar civil fine imposed on common
carriers that failed to pay claimants within a specified period after being
held liable for damages. 153 Another case Justice Stevens cites, Standard Oil
Co. of Indiana v. Missouri, 154 also offers no support for the view that the
Due Process Clause places substantive limitations on the amount of
punitive damages. Rather, the case addresses a state-imposed fine and the
obligation of states not to impose excessive fines. 155 In short, Justice
Stevens provides no precedential support for what now stands as a majority
view in favor of substantive due process limitations on punitive damages.
Nonetheless, his opinion became the cornerstone of the Court's subsequent
opinion invalidating the punitive damages award in BMW, where the Court
relied exclusively on TXO and its antecedents to support its inauguration of
federal excessiveness review. 156
This analysis of the relevant cases leading up to BMW and their
purported tum-of-the-century antecedents reveals that the precedential
foundation for the Court's pronouncement that "The Due Process Clause of
its own force also prohibits the States from imposing ' grossly excessive'
punishments on tortfeasors" 157 is virtually nonexistent. 158 Far from
evincing a long-standing view of the substantive limitations imposed by the
Due Process Clause, the handful of continually cited precedents only give
us insight into the Court's treatment of criminal and civil fines or other
"penal" sanctions. 159 Extrapolating from such cases to divine a substantive
limit on punitive damages awarded in tort cases is an untenable step,
153. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 207 U.S. at 75-76.
154. Standard Oil Co. of Ind. v. Missouri, 224 U.S. 270 (1912).
155. Id. at 280-86. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919) and
Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Danaher, 238 U.S. 482 (1915), cases that were already discussed supra text
accompanying notes 101-12 round out Justice Stevens' s list of citations.
156. See BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) ('The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a 'grossly excessive' punishment on a
tortfeasor." (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993) (plurality
opinion))).
157. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 434 (2001).
158. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he only authority for the Court's
position is simply not authoritative. These cases fall far short of what is needed to supplant this
country's longstanding practice regarding exemplary awards.").
159. Justice Scalia goes further in his critique by charging that these cases "simply fabricated the
'substantive due process' right at issue." Id. at 60 I .
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particularly in light of the Court's determination that punitive damages are
not sufficiently penal or fine-like to fall within the protection of the Eighth
Amendment. Given that the Court's prior cases do not provide support for
the Court's current interpretation of the Due Process Clause, the next
section considers whether the Court nonetheless has interpreted the Clause
in a manner consistent with its text, history, and original meaning.
C. SUBJECTIVE DUE PROCESS
Shorn from its purported precedential underpinnings, the Court's
federal excessiveness jurisprudence must be justified on its own terms as
sound constitutional doctrine. It becomes clear, however, when one
analyzes the Court's view of the relationship between the Due Process
Clause and punitive damages, that the Court's interpretation of the
Constitution in this context is not consonant with any understood meaning
of the phrase "due process of law."
1. The Meaning of Due Process
The antecedent of "due process of law" is ''per legem terrae" or "law
of the land," which originates from the Magna Carta. 1 60 The Court has long
understood this core phrase, "law of the land" and its descendant "due
process of law," as protecting the citizenry against arbitrary exercises of
governmental power:
In England the requirement of due process of law, in cases where life,
liberty and property were affected, was originally designed to secure the
subject against the arbitrary action of the crown, and to place him under
the protection of the law. The words were held to be the equivalent of
"law of the land." And a similar purpose must be ascribed to them when
applied to a legislative body in this country; that is, that they are
intended, in addition to other guaranties of private rights, to give
increased security against the arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, and
the arbitrary spoliation of property. 1 61
160. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & hnprovement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1 855)
('The words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the
words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Chana."); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process
of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 368-69 (191 I) (tracing the origins of the phrase
"due process of law" to the Magna Carta). See also Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1875)
("Due process of law is process due according to the law of the land.").
1 61. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885). See also County of Sacramento v.
Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) ("We have emphasized time and again that '[t]he touchstone of due
process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."' (quoting Wolff v.
McDonnell, 4 1 8 U.S. 539, 558 (1974))).
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Although this protection initially stood as a guard only against the
excesses of the federal government, via the Fifth Amendment, the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment enshrined a protection against arbitrary
exercises of power by the state governments. In both contexts, the Due
Process Clause requires that governmental deprivations of life, liberty, or
property be effected pursuant to validly enacted laws. 1 62 It also obligates
the government to provide procedures that have long been held to be
fundamental to ensuring that such deprivations are fundamentally fair 163
and nonarbitrary: notice, an opportunity to be heard,164 and the right to an
impartial decisionmaker, 165 who decides matters on the basis of presented
information. 166 Additionally, in the Fourteenth Amendment context, the
Due Process Clause has been interpreted to mean that state governments
have to afford citizens most of the rights given to national citizens in the
Bill of Rights to the extent that such rights are deemed critical components
of fundamental fairness. 167
162. See Scalia, supra note 20, at 24-25 ("Property can be taken by the state; liberty can be taken;
even life can be taken; but not without the process that our traditions require-notably, a validly
enacted law and a fair trial."). See also Corwin, supra note 160, at 372 (describing early state
interpretations of the phrase "by the law of the land" as meaning "a law for the people, . . . made or
adopted by themselves by the intervention of their own legislature").
163. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 3 1 2 (1992) ("Due process centrally concerns
the fundamental fairness of governmental activity.").
164. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 1 9, 333 (1976) ('This Court consistently has held that some
form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. . . . The
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.'" (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)) (citations omitted));
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Mullane states:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process
Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life,
liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case.
Id.
165. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 178 (1994) ("A necessary component of a fair trial is
an impartial judge.").
166. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 27 1 (1970). The particulars of these requirements have
been held to depend on the level of procedural protection appropriate given the circumstances,
something that is determined with reference to a three-factor test articulated by the Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge:

[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three
distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Matthews, 424 U.S. at 334-35.
167. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968). Duncan states:
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The Court has indicated, however, that "[t]he Due Process Clause
guarantees more than fair process." 1 68 Thus, "substantive" due process
rights have been determined to exist as well, even though they may find no
place within the Bill of Rights. 169 As the Court has explained, "It is a
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which
the government may not enter," and this realm constitutes a "substantive
sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects." 170 The limits
of this sphere are amorphous but discernible; as the second Justice Harlan
explained:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a
series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property;
The Fourteenth Amendment denies the States the power to 'deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.' In resolving conflicting claims concerning the
meaning of this spacious language, the Court has looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights for
guidance; many of the rights guaranteed by the first eight Amendments to the Constitution
have been held to be protected against state action by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. Laurence Tribe has argued that the selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states
should more properly have been done via the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities
Clause. Tribe, supra note 5, at 1 84 ("In reality, it would accord fully with the history of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause and a sensible reading of its language to make it, rather than the Due Process
Clause, the basic vehicle for selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the states."). The
Privileges or Immunities Clause reads, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." U.S. CONST. amend. XN, § I .
168. Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 1 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). See also Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 1 15, 1 25 (1992) (stating that the Due Process Clause "protects individual
liberty against 'certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them"' (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 3 3 1 ( 1986))).
169. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992). Casey states:
It is tempting, as a means of curbing the discretion of federal judges, to suppose that liberty
encompasses no more than those rights already guaranteed to the individual against federal
interference by the express provisions of the first eight Amendments to the Constitution. But
of course this Court has never accepted that view.
Id. (citation omitted).
170. Id. at 847-48. One might plausibly trace substantive due process doctrine at least back to the
now repudiated case of Lochner v. New York, where the Court indicated, "The general right to make a
contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); David E.
Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionis"4 Revised: Lochner an d the Origins of Fundamental Rights
Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1 , 1 2-13 (2003) ("Lochner was the progenitor of modem substantive
due process cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, Roe v. Wade, and Lawrence v. Texas." (footnotes
omitted)). Laurence Tribe has suggested that various substantive liberty interests essential to being "a
self-governing person" might plausibly fit within the privileges and immunities of Americans, thus
warranting protection through the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than the Due Process Clause. See Tribe, supra note 5, at 184, 188-9 1 , 194 ("[U]se of the Privileges or
lmmunities Clause [is] a less troublesome vehicle both for selective incorporation and for the
elaboration of whatever unenumerated rights merit protection against the states.").
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the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear
arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on. It
is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom
from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and
which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must,
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state
needs asserted to justify their abridgment. 171

Among the liberty interests deemed to fall within this sphere of
substantive due process protection are: the right to marry,1 72 have
children, 1 73 direct their education, 174 use contraception, 175 and refuse
unwanted medical treatrnent. 176
The Court has made it clear that although substantive due process
protects a range of unenumerated rights, 1 77 the concept must not be treated
as unrestricted and used expansively. To the contrary, the Court is to tread
carefully in determining that a particular right warrants inclusion within
this protective sphere:
[W]e "ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive
due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this
unchartered area are scarce and open-ended." By extending
constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a
great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and
legislative action. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever
we are asked to break new ground in this field," lest the liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy
preferences of the Members of this Court. 1 78
1 7 1 . Poe v . Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 ( 196 l ) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
172. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 ( 1 967).
173. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 3 1 6 U.S. 535 (1942) (passing on the due process challenge and
reversing the Jaw at issue on equal protection grounds).
174. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (I 923).
I 75. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480-81, 485 (I 965).
1 76. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
177. This is not a noncontroversial proposition. Justice Scalia had the following to say about the
idea that due process protects unenumerated substantive liberties:
My favorite example of a departure from text-and certainly the departure that has enabled
judges to do more freewheeling lawmaking than any other-pertains to the Due Process
Clause . . . . It has been interpreted to prevent the government from taking away certain
liberties beyond those . . . that are specifically named in the Constitution. Well, it may or may
not be a good thing to guarantee additional liberties, but the Due Process Clause quite
obviously does not bear that interpretation.
Scalia, supra note 20, at 24. It is beyond the scope of this Article to quarrel with the notion of
substantive due process.
178. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 ( 1997) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 1 1 5, 125 ( 1992)).
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To forestall the unwarranted expansion of substantive due process, the
Court has determined that protection is only appropriate for "those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty,' such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed."179 Thus, the Court has said, "Our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices . . . provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible
decisionmaking' that direct and restrain our exposition of the Due Process
Clause."180
Beyond the well-established procedural guarantees and traditional
substantive liberties discussed above, text, history, and precedent do not
reveal additional protections provided by the right to "due process." Early
after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment many litigants mistakenly
took the phrase "due process of law" to provide a mechanism for
propagating challenges to lower court judgments on the generalized ground
that the result was "harsh" or "unjust," notwithstanding the fact that such
challengers had been afforded sufficient notice, hearing, and other
protections:
[F]rom the number of instances in which these words are invoked to set
aside the legislation of the States, there is abundant evidence . . . "that
there exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision[,]
as found in the Fourteenth Amendment." It seems . . . ["]to be looked
upon []as a means of bringing to the test of the decision of this court the
abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in a State court[] of the
justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the legislation on
which such a decision may be founded."
This language was used in 1877, and now, after the lapse of eight years,
it may be repeated with an expression of increased surprise at the
continued misconception of the purpose of the provision. 18 1

In an effort to make clear the scope of protection that the Due Process
Clause provides, Justice Field, the author of the opinion just quoted, wrote:
If the laws enacted by a State be within the legitimate sphere of
legislative power, and their enforcement be attended with the observance
of those general rules which our system of jurisprudence prescribes for
the security of private rights, the harshness, injustice, and oppressive
1 19. Id. at 720-2 1 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 43 1 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
1 80. Id. at 721 (quoting Collins, 503 U.S. at 125).
1 8 1 . Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v . Humes, 1 15 U.S. 512, 519-20 (1 885) (quoting Davidson v . New
Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 ( 1 877) (brackets reflect changes from the original source not noted in
Humes)).
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character of such laws will not invalidate them as affecting life, liberty or
property without due process of law. 1 82

From this statement can be found the sum total of what due process means
in the federal system under the Fourteenth Amendment: it obligates states
to follow general procedural rules that provide security of private rights
notice, hearing, an impartial decisionmaker, and the like-and it constrains
states from acting beyond their "legitimate sphere of legislative power."
Both limitations keep states from exercising their power arbitrarily or in a
way that infringes upon traditionally held substantive liberty interests.
What due process does not guarantee under this framework is that the law
or its application will not produce harsh, unjust, or oppressive results.
Protection against such evils must be accomplished by other means
designed to impose limitations on what the government can do. Thus, for
example, the Eighth Amendment creates an express prohibition against
punishments that are unduly harsh because they are "excessive" or "cruel
and unusual," 183 creating a substantive right that governments in this
country may not transgress. In short, due process protects procedural
fairness and fundamental liberty interests, but fails to proscribe any harsh
or oppressive outcomes a fair process may generate.
2. Policy over Law
The Court's interpretation of the Due Process Clause, as providing a
substantive limit beyond which punitive damages may not go, strays well
beyond the boundaries of due process doctrine as heretofore delineated by
the Court and briefly sketched out above. The Court has couched its
excessiveness jurisprudence in the language of procedural due process
indicating that the BMW guideposts are necessary to provide defendants
with "fair notice" of the severity of potential punishment and to prevent
arbitrary punishment from being imposed-dutifully "mouth[ing] a couple
of buzzwords from standard due process jargon." 184 The doctrine, however,
cannot plausibly claim to derive from the Court's traditional view of those
concepts.
It may be true that parties should have notice that specific conduct
may subject them to a certain degree of punishment; however, that in no
way translates into a constitutionally imposed maximum beyond which
182. Id. at 520.
183. U.S. CONST. amend. Vill.
184. The quoted language is borrowed from Akhil Reed Amar, lnt ratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 747, 767 (1999), an article that argues the Constitution should be read holistically for more
accurate interpretation.
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punitive damages may not go. Rather, it means that prospective tortfeasors
must be aware, ex ante, that their wrongful conduct will subject them to
punitive damages of a level deemed appropriate by a jury of their peers,
with jurors measuring propriety with reference to the state's legitimate
goals of punishment and deterrence. That the jury's discretion is
constrained only in that its award must be limited to an amount sufficient to
achieve punishment and deterrence, rather than to any fixed dollar amount,
may render prospective punishment potentially harsh, but does not
implicate the defendant's right to notice. To paraphrase Justice Field's
remarks in Humes, the "harshness, injustice, and oppressive" nature of a
punitive damages award is not a violation of due process so long as it is
imposed "with the observance of those general rules which our system of
jurisprudence prescribes for the security of private rights. " 185
Similarly, defendants should indeed be protected from arbitrary
punitive damages awards; but again, the need to prevent arbitrary awards
does not warrant the establishment of a constitutional damages cap. Rather,
an interest in avoiding arbitrary awards justifies policing of the procedures
under which states impose punitive damages awards and the standards in
place to guide and constrain jurors' discretion in this area. Punitive awards
that flow from juries attentive to the need to limit damages to an amount
sufficient to punish and deter, and subject to state court appellate review for
compliance with such strictures are not arbitrary. To the contrary, they
reflect a state's considered judgment that punitive awards of a given
amount are appropriate.
Notwithstanding, then, the Court's rhetoric of procedural due process,
one could more properly classify the Court's excessiveness jurisprudence
as having identified a substantive due process right against a "grossly
excessive" punitive damages award.186 Given the Court's statements
regarding the nature and limits of substantive due process and the tradition
of unconstrained state and jury authority over punitive damages, the
Court's excessiveness jurisprudence is an inappropriate expansion creating
a new right that due process was never meant to comprehend. Justice
Marshall's comments on behalf of the Court regarding the traditional
understanding of punitive damages bear repeating here:
The concept of punitive or exemplary damages was first articulated in
Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K. B. 1763)-one of
185. Humes, 1 1 5 U.S. at 520.
186. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing
one of "[t]he most significant aspects of [the BMW] decision" as "the identification of a 'substantive
due process' right against a 'grossly excessive' award").
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the general warrant cases. There Lord Camden found that the power to
award such damages was inherent in the jury's exercise of uncontrolled
discretion in the awarding of damages. Today these damages are
rationalized as a way to punish the wrongdoer and to admonish others
not to err. Thus they serve the same function as criminal penalties and
are in effect private fines. Unlike criminal penalties, however, punitive
damages are not awarded within discernible limits but can be awarded in
almost any amount. 181

Although Justice Marshall went on to indicate that states have imposed
excessiveness or proportionality limitations on the amount of punitive
damages, 188 as is their right, he made no mention of federal constitutional
constraints on the amount of such awards. As can be seen, then, it is clear
that states traditionally have been unconstrained in their ability to award
punitive damages.
Thus, the new due process right against excessive punitive damages
that the Court has created is clearly not one of "those fundamental rights
and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed," a
requirement the Court has indicated a right must fulfill to be protected by
substantive due process. 189 Perhaps had the Court determined that the
Founders included punitive damages awards within the ambit of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, it would be possible to argue that a
deep tradition against the excessiveness of such awards has long existed.
Because, however, the Court itself has indicated that the Founders'
decision to omit mention of punitive damages from the Eighth Amendment
was deliberate and evinced an intent not to limit punitive damages
awards, 190 it is more accurate to say that history and tradition reveal the
absence of a deeply-rooted principle against excessive punitive damages
awards.
Not fitting neatly within its own procedural or substantive due process
jurisprudence, the Court's excessiveness doctrine might rightly be seen as a
1 87. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-83 (197 1 ) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
1 88. See id. at 83.
1 89. Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 1 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, Ohio, 43 1 U.S. 494, 503 (I 977) (plurality opinion) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 3 19,
325 (1937)).
190. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 273-75 (1989)
("[T)he Framers of the Eighth Amendment did not expressly intend it to apply to damages awards made
by civil juries.").
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manifestation of what this author calls subjective due process: a
jurisprudence of substantive legal protections imposed by the Court in the
name of due process that have a basis only in the subjective policy interests
of their proponents on the Court. 191 Justice Black was an early opponent of
subjective due process jurisprudence. On several occasions he commented
on the difficulty with the Court's practice of invoking "natural law" or
"fundamental [principles of] liberty" as the basis for the articulation of
various rights or, more problematically, as the basis for the invalidation of
legislative actions:
This decision reasserts a constitutional theory . . . that this Court is
endowed by the Constitution with boundless power under "natural law"
periodically to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform
to the Court's conception of what at a particular time constitutes
"civilized decency" and "fundamental liberty and j ustice."
. . . [T]he "natural law" theory of the Constitution . . . degrade[s] the
constitutional safeguards of the Bill of Rights and simultaneously
appropriate[s] for this Court a broad power which we are not authorized
by the Constitution to exercise. 192

Writing in dissent in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay
View,193 Justice Black lashed out at the Court's lurch toward a subjective
due process by writing:
The Wisconsin law is said to violate the "fundamental principles of due
process." Of course the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains no words that indicate that this Court has power to
play so fast and loose with state laws. The arguments the Court makes to
reach what 1 consider to be its unconstitutional conclusion, however,
show why it strikes down this state law. lt is because it considers a
191. Others have aptly noted how the Court's creation of a substantive due process right against
excessive punitive damages awards harkens back to widely repudiated Lochnerism. See, e.g., Jeffrey R.
White, State Farm and Punitive Damages: Call the Jury Back, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 79, 95 (2005)
("Permitting federal appeals judges to determine for themselves the amount of punitive damages . . .
'would be Lochnerism on a massive scale."' (quoting Alan Howard Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of
Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L REV. 1 42,
1 82 ( 1 99 1 ))); Zipursky, supra note 26, at 162 (describing the BMW doctrine as "an amorphous due
process constraint perilously close to delegitimated Lochner precedents"). On the Court's rejection of
Lochnerian economic substantive due process, see Ferguson v. Skrupa. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726, 730-32 ( 1 963) ("[W]e emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts used the Due
Process Clause 'to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they
may be unwise, improvident, or out of hannony with a particular school of thought."' (quoting
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 ( 1 955))).
192. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-70 ( 1 947) (Black, J., dissenting).
193. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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garnishment law of this kind to be bad state policy, a judgment I think
the state legislature, not this Court, has power to make . . . .
. . . There is not one word in our Federal Constitution or in any of its
Amendments and not a word in the reports of that document's passage
from which one can draw the slightest inference that we have authority
thus to try to supplement or strike down the State's selection of its own
policies. The Wisconsin law is simply nullified by this Court as though
the Court had been granted a super-legislative power to step in and
frustrate policies of States adopted by their own elected legislatures. 194

Justice Black's description of the Court' s excesses in Sniadach is apt here;
the Court has appointed itself as a super-legislature with the power to
supplant state choices regarding appropriate levels of punitive damages
with the Court's own view. Indeed, what ultimately has happened here is
that Justice O'Connor's (along with Justice Stevens's) policy views
regarding the excessiveness of punitive damages-which she initially
attempted to vindicate through the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause195-have been embraced by the Court in the name of due process.
As Justice O'Connor wrote in Browning-Ferris:
Awards of punitive damages are skyrocketing. As recently as a decade
ago, the largest award of punitive damages affirmed by an appellate
court in a products liability case was $250,000. Since then, awards more
than 30 times as high have been sustained on appeal. The threat of such
enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and
development of new products. Some manufacturers of prescription
drugs, for example, have decided that it is better to avoid uncertain
liability than to introduce a new pill or vaccine into the market.
Similarly, designers of airplanes and motor vehicles have been forced to
abandon new projects for fear of lawsuits that can often lead to awards of
punitive damages.196

Justice Blackmun expressed similar concern on behalf of the Court
when he wrote, "We note once again our concern about punitive damages
that 'run wild."'197
Justice Scalia had it right when he responded, "Since the Constitution
does not make that concern any of our business, the Court's activities in
this area are an unjustified incursion into the province of state
Id. at 344-45 (Black, J., dissenting).
195. See Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 297 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("In my view, the $6 million award of punitive damages imposed on BFI constitutes
a fine subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment.").
196. Id. at 282 (citations omitted).
197. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, I 8 (1991 ).
194.
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governments." 198 Setting punitive damages policy is not within the purview
of the Court. The Court itself has readily acknowledged that judgments
about the propriety of a particular punishment for a given offense are
legislative rather than judicial determinations. 199 States through their
legislatures, courts, and juries have always enjoyed unconstrained authority
over the imposition of punitive damages awards, provided that procedural
due process requirements are honored. Therefore, there is no warrant for
holding that there is a fundamental liberty interest, protected by substantive
due process, in having punitive damages not exceed a particular amount. In
insisting that due process supplies and protects such an interest, the Court is
not interpreting the Due Process Clause but rewriting it.200 If, as the Court
once remarked, the Necessary and Proper Clause is "the last, best hope of
those who defend ultra vires congressional action,"201 then the Due Process
Clause has become the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires
judicial regulation. Without respect for the intended confines of the Due
Process Clause, or the principles of federalism protected by the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments,202 the Due Process Clause, like the Necessary and
Proper Clause, "will always be a back door for unconstitutional federal
regulation. "203
D. AN IMPERMISSIBLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION

In view of the fact that the Court's interpretation of the Due Process
Clause vis-a-vis punitive damages is not supported by the language or
historical meaning of the phrase "due process of law," the only remaining
question is whether the Court nonetheless may construe the Clause as it has
simply by virtue of its status as the ultimate arbiter of what the Constitution
means.204 Although the Court's interpretive authority over the Constitution
is supreme, it is not unlimited. Various canons of constitutional
1 98. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1 99. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 , 336 (1998) ("[J]udgments about the
appropriate punishment for an offense belong in the first instance to the legislature."); Gore v. United
States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) ("Whatever views may be entertained regarding severity of
punishment, . . . these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy." (citation omitted)).
200. Cf Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2236 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Federal
power expands, but never contracts, with each new locution. The majority is not interpreting the
Commerce Clause, but rewriting it.").
20 1 . Printz v . United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997).
202. See infra Part ill.D.2.
203. Cf Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2226 (O'Connor, J ., dissenting).
204. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
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construction-such as the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius205serve at least as nominal or presumptive bounds on how the Court may
interpret the document.206 More forcefully, the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments to the Constitution combine to place strict limits on the
construction the Court may give to provisions of the Constitution. The
Court may not construe a provision to deny the people rights they have
retained simply because those retained rights are not specifically
enumerated.207 Neither may the Court interpret the Constitution in a way
that vests the national government with powers not delegated to it but
reserved to the states.208 The Court's interpretation of the Due Process
Clause as supplying substantive limits on the amount of punitive damages
that state juries may award not only violates certain canons of
constitutional construction, but also is deeply at odds with the limited
federal form of government that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were
meant to protect.
The Constitution was not meant to supplant state sovereignty with that
of a national government; rather, the Constitution was crafted to unite the
states into a Union that could achieve certain national ends while the states
retained many, if not most, of the essential aspects of their separate
existence. Justice Nelson aptly encapsulated this point during an extensive
discussion of state sovereignty in Collector v. Day:
It is a familiar rule of construction of the Constitution of the Union,
that the sovereign powers vested in the State governments by their
respective constitutions, remained unaltered and unimpaired, except so
far as they were granted to the government of the United States. That the
intention of the framers of the Constitution in this respect might not be
misunderstood, this rule of interpretation is expressly declared in the
tenth article of the amendments, namely: ''The powers not delegated to
the United States are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." The government of the United States, therefore, can claim no
powers which are not granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers
205. "Expression of the one is exclusion of the other." Scalia, supra note 20, at 25.
206. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 237 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting)
("[Tlhe Constitution must be interpreted by attributing to its words the meaning which they bore at the
time of its adoption and in view of commonly-accepted canons of construction, its history, early and
long-continued practices under it, and relevant opinions of this court.").
207. The Ninth Amendment provides, ''The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
208. The Tenth Amendment provides, ''The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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actually granted must be such as are expressly given, or given by
necessary implication.209

Thus, although the federal government was delegated certain powers
when the Union was formed, the Tenth Amendment indicates that states
were left free to perform those functions they had always performed-such
as exercising their police powers2 10 and providing for the adjudication of
disputes in their own courts2l l -provided the powers were "not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States. "212
In view of this relationship between states and the national
government, the Court rightly indicated in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
that the national government is not empowered to develop and impose
common law rules that would be applicable within and across all of the
states:
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether
they be local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a
part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts.213

To the contrary, the common law traditions of states remained intact
under the Constitution. Nothing in the main text of the Constitution or the
209. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (1 1 Wall.) 1 1 3, 1 24-26 ( 1 870). See also Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 ( 1 97 1) (explaining that federal-state comity means "a proper respect for state functions, a
recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and
a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions
are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 7 1 4,
722 ( 1877). The Court states:
The several States of the Union are not, it is true, in every respect independent, many of the
rights and powers which originally belonged to them being now vested in the government
created by the Constitution. But, except as restrained and limited by that instrument, they
possess and exercise the authority of independent States, and the principles of public law to
which we have referred are applicable to them.
Id.

2 1 0. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 6 1 8 n.8 (2000) ("[Tlhe Constitution reserves
the general police power to the States."). See also Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 ( 1 949) (plurality
opinion) ('The police power of a state extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends the
duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being and tranquility of a community.").
2 1 1 . See Collector, 78 U.S. at 1 26. The Court states:
We have said that one of the reserved powers was that to establish a judicial department; it
would have been more accurate, and in accordance with the existing state of things at the
time, to have said the power to maintain a judicial department. All of the thirteen States were
in the possession of this power, and had exercised it at the adoption of the Constitution; and it
is not pretended that any grant of it to the general government is found in that instrument.
Id.

212.
213.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
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Bill of Rights purported to impair the ability of states to continue to follow
their common law traditions both with respect to the formulation of
substantive legal principles and with respect to principles concerning the
judicial process and remedies. Indeed, as Justice Field explained long
before the Court adopted its view in Erie, the Constitution not only fails to
impair state power over state common law but also stands as an affirmative
bar, or "perpetual protest," against such a notion:
[T]he general law of the country . . . has been often advanced in judicial
opinions of this court to control a conflicting law of a state. . . . But, . . .
there stands, as a perpetual protest against its repetition, the Constitution
of the United States, which recognizes and preserves the autonomy and
independence of the States . . . . Supervision over either the legislative or
the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible except as to
matters by the Constitution specially authorized or delegated to the
United States. Any interference with either, except as thus permitted, is
an invasion of the authority of the State, and, to that extent, a denial of its
independence.214

A longstanding element of states' common law authority has been
their power to empanel juries and impose punitive damages awards in
appropriate cases. The Supreme Court made this clear long ago in Day v.
Woodworth when it wrote:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in actions of
trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant,
having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of
compensation to the plaintiff. We are aware that the propriety of this
doctrine has been questioned by some writers; but if repeated judicial
decisions for more than a century are to be received as the best
exposition of what the law is, the question will not admit of argument.
By the common as well as by statute law, men are often punished for
aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of a civil action, and
the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to the
party injured.215

Indeed, beyond the power to impose such damages it has been equally
acknowledged that the amount of punitive damages awards under the
214. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 ( 1 893) (Field, J., dissenting).
215. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 37 1 (1852) (emphasis added). See also Pac. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. I , 26 ( 1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In 1 868 . . . when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted, punitive damages were undoubtedly an established pan of the American
common law of torts.").
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common law has always been for the jury to determine.216 More recently,
and consistent with principles articulated in Erie, the Court acknowledged
that crafting standards of excessiveness for punitive damages awards is a
matter of state common law:
Although petitioners and their amici would like us to craft some
common-law standard of excessiveness that relies on notions of
proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages, or makes
reference to statutory penalties for similar conduct, these are matters of
state, and not federal, common law. Adopting a rule along the lines
petitioners suggest would require us to ignore the distinction between the
state-law and federal-law issues. For obvious reasons we decline that
invitation. 217

Because it appears that states and their citizens retained the right and
authority to impose, through juries, punitive damages awards at a level of
their choosing, constrained only by notions of excessiveness devised and
imposed by the states themselves, the question then is whether the
Fourteenth Amendment can be read to have imposed substantive federal
constraints in this area as identified by the Court. The most likely candidate
for such a constraint would have been the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, · given the
amendment's concern with the substantive degree of punitive sanctions.218
The Court, however, has declared that the Eighth Amendment cannot be
read to apply to punitive damages awards because in its view, the
amendment was intended to apply only to "direct actions initiated by
government to inflict punishment," not "to awards of punitive damages in
cases between private parties."219
Because it rejected recourse to the Eighth Amendment as a source for
a substantive limitation on punitive damages, the Court was left with no
other constitutional provisions that addressed the issue on its face.
Nonetheless, the Court identified the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as the constitutional provision that supplies the very limitation
it determined that the Eighth Amendment failed to provide. But this use of
the Due Process Clause is untenable both as a matter of the basic canons of
2 16. See Barry v. Edmunds, 1 16 U.S. 550, 565 (1 886) ("[Nlothing is better settled than that . . . it
is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount [of punitive damages] by their verdict.").
See also Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 1 15 U.S. 512, 521 ( 1 885) ('The discretion of the jury in such
cases is not controlled by any very definite rules.").
2 17. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989).
2 1 8. The Eighth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2 19. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260.
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constitutional construction and as a matter of federalism as protected by the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
1. Canons of Constitutional Construction
Two canons of constitutional construction are violated by the Court's
interpretation of due process: expressio unius est exclusio alterius220 and
the rule against constructions that render other provisions of the
Constitution redundant surplusage.22 1 The Court relied on the former canon
when it held that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to punitive
damages awards:
But the practice of awarding damages far in excess of actual
compensation for quantifiable injuries was well recognized at the time
the Framers produced the Eighth Amendment. Awards of double or
treble damages authorized by statute date back to the 1 3th century, and
the doctrine was expressly recognized in cases as early as 1763. Despite
this recognition of civil exemplary damages as punitive in nature, the
Eighth Amendment did not expressly include it within its scope. Rather,
as we earlier have noted, the text of the Amendment points to an intent to
deal only with the prosecutorial powers of govemment.222

In other words, given the Framers' familiarity with punitive damages, if
they wanted the Eighth Amendment to apply to punitive damages awards,
they would have said so.
220. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. ( 14 Pet.) 540, 59 1 ( 1 840) (dictum) (opinion of
Barbour, J.). Justice Barbour states:
[A]s the Constitution contains several express prohibitions upon the states, from the exercise
of powers granted to the federal government; if we were to apply to its construction the
maxim so well founded in reason, expressio unius, est exclusio alterius, it would seem to lead
to the conclusion that all the powers were expressly prohibited which were intended to be
prohibited.

Id.

Justice Thomas explained this maxim in the context of qualifications for Representatives when he
wrote:
"[F]rorn the very nature of such a provision, the affirmation of these qualifications would
seem to imply a negative of all others." This argument rests on the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. Wben the Framers decided which qualifications to include in the
Constitution, they also decided not to include any other qualifications in the Constitution.
U.S. Tenn Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 868 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted) (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §
624 (1 833)).
22 1 . Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 ( 1 803) (''The subsequent part of the section
is mere surplusage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the construction . . . . lt cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.").
222. Browning-Fer ris, 492 U.S. at 274-75 (citation and footnote omitted).

1134

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA I.AW REVIEW

[Vol. 79:1085

As the Court has held, the Framers' familiarity with punitive damages
awards and their failure to include them within the Eighth Amendment's
express terms means that the amendment does not pertain to such awards.
The same reasoning requires the conclusion that the Framers' failure to
mention punitive damages awards anywhere in the Constitution suggests
that no substantive limits on punitive damages were intended at all. Put
differently, the Court's expressio unius reasoning applies not only to the
Eighth Amendment, but also to the whole of the Bill of Rights. Such
reasoning is consistent with that endorsed by Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist; in providing an example of the "proper use and true meaning"
of the expressio uni':ls maxim in the context of constitutional interpretation,
Hamilton wrote the following:
The plan of the convention declares that the power of Congress . . . shall
extend to certain enumerated cases. This specification of particulars
evidently excludes all pretension to a general legislative authority,
because an affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd, as well
as useless, if a general authority was intended.

In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures is
declared by the Constitution to comprehend certain cases particularly
specified. The expression of those cases marks the precise limits, beyond
which the federal courts cannot extend their jurisdiction, because the
objects of their cognizance being enumerated, the specification would be
nugatory if it did not exclude all ideas of more extensive authority. 223

In like manner, by expressly indicating limitations on certain types of
judicial impositions (bail, fines, and punishments) but failing to mention
others of which the Founders were well aware (compensatory and
exemplary damages), one cannot plausibly read into the Due Process
Clause a limitation on punitive damages that the Founders failed to
mention.
Additionally, where the limitation at issue is of particular
importance-as would be the case with the imposition of a theretofore
nonexistent constraint on the discretion of juries-the restriction cannot
properly be left to implication where other limitations of a similar kind are
expressly mentioned. James Madison articulated just such a rule of
interpretation that can help reveal the impropriety of the Court's current
course. In · his speech against a bill proposing that the United States
incorporate a national bank, Madison suggested several rules of
constitutional interpretation ; the fifth among these was as follows: "In
223. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 137 (Alexander Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing Co., 1937).
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admitting or rejecting a constructive authority, not only the degree of its
incidentality to an express authority, is to be regarded, but the degree of its
importance also; since on this will depend the probability or improbability
of its being left to construction."224 What Madison means here is that the
more important the authority at issue, the less likely it is that the framers of
the Constitution would have left the matter to interpretation, speculation, or
conjecture;225 "[t]hus, if it is not expressly listed in the Constitution, the
omission likely was intentional."226 Had the Founders intended to limit
punitive damages awards granted in civil cases in the same manner that
they limited fines and punishments imposed in actions initiated by the
government, "it cannot be that they would not have explicitly said so."227 It
makes little sense to say that the Founders purposely omitted exemplary
damages when they wrote the Eighth Amendment but intended them to be
covered by implication elsewhere.
One might certainly suggest that applying expressio unius reasoning to
conclude that a right against excessive punitive damages is not present in
the Constitution runs counter to the command of the Ninth Amendment that
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."228 The
problem with such an argument, however, is that history fails to disclose
any pre-constitutional protection against excessive punitive damages
224. James Madison, speech before Congress, (Feb. 23, 1791), in GAZETTE OF THE U.S. (Phila.),
Feb. 23, 1791, reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS: THIRD
SESSION: DECEMBER 1790-MARCH 1791 369 (William Charles DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995). For
the curious, the other four rules Madison presented were as follows:
An interpretation that destroys the very characteristic of the government cannot be j ust.
Where a meaning is clear, the consequences, whatever they may be, are to be admitted
where doubtful, it is fairly triable by its consequences.
In controverted cases, the meaning of the parties to the instrument, if to be collected by
reasonable evidence, is a proper guide.
Contemporary and concurrent expositions are a reasonable evidence of the meaning of the
parties.
Id.
225. Cf Scalia, supra note 20, at 29 ("[S]ince congressional elimination of state sovereign
immunity is such an extraordinary act, one would normally expect it to be explicitly decreed rather than
offhandedly implied-so something like a 'clear statement' rule is merely normal interpretation.").
226. Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 387
(2004).
227. Twp. of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 666, 674-75 (1873). Pine Grove states:
The case as to the constitution is a proper one for the application of the maxim, Expressio
unius est exclusio alterius. The instrument is drawn with ability, care, and fulness [sic] of
details. If those who framed it had intended to forbid the granting of such aid by the municipal
corporations of the State, as well as by the State itself, it cannot be that they would not have
explicitly said so.
Id.
228. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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awards that one could purport had been "retained." On the contrary, history
reveals that the pre-constitutional state of affairs involved unfettered jury
discretion over such awards;229 a power that the Constitution would have to
expressly constrain to reach, given the requirements of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.230
The Court's interpretation of due process as including a prohibition
against excessive punitive damages awards also violates the canon against
constructions that render other constitutional provisions redundant. If it is
the case that the Due Process Clauses-both in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments-impose substantive limitations against excessive punitive
damages awards, then the clauses must also impose limitations against
excessive fines and punishments in actions initiated by the government.
The rationale behind the Court' s excessiveness jurisprudence respecting
punitive damages and respecting fines and criminal punishments is the
same, and the Court has treated the limitations in both spheres as related
variants of a unified doctrine, notwithstanding their nominally distinct
textual bases.23 1 But if this is so, the Eighth Amendment, at least to the
extent it prohibits excessive penal sanctions,232 is redundant. Indeed, this is
the very point raised by Justice Scalia in his dissent in TXO:
It is particularly difficult to imagine that "due process" contains the
substantive right not to be subjected to excessive punitive damages, since
if it contains that it would surely also contain the substantive rigbt not to
be subjected to excessive fines, which would make the Excessive Fines

229. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82-83 (1971) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (acknowledging a long-standing tradition of unlimited jury discretion).
230. See infra Part ill.D.2 for a discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
231. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001), the Court
discussed its excessiveness jurisprudence for the two different spheres as if they were one and the same,
conceding only that different texts provide authority for the doctrines:
Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the imposition of criminal
penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution imposes substantive limits on that discretion. That Clause makes the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments
applicable to the States. The Due Process Clause of its own force also prohibits the States
from imposing "grossly excessive" punishments on tortfeasors.
Id. at 433-34 (citations omitted) (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996)
(quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 ( 1 993) (plurality opinion))).
The Court went on to discuss the rationale underlying its excessiveness doctrines in an integrated
fashion without distinguishing between the doctrine as it applied to punitive damages awards versus
fines and criminal punishments. See, e.g. , Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 434 (stating, "In these cases,
the constitutional violations were predicated on judicial determinations that the punishments were
'grossly disproportional to the gravity of . . . defendant[s'J offense[s],"' and citing both to criminal and
civil cases (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998))).
232. One can only speculate whether the Court, absent the Eighth Amendment, would read into
the Due Process Clause a bar against "cruel and unusual" punishment.
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Clause of the Eighth Amendment superfluous in light of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment."233

What is the purpose of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment if the Due Process Clause just as ably accomplishes the same
thing? The Excessive Fines Clause becomes surplusage once the Court's
interpretation is accepted because there is no plausible way to hold that due
process limits the excessiveness of punitive damages awards but provides
no similar guard against the excessiveness of other punitive sanctions. The
more defensible interpretation would be that the Eighth Amendment's
explicit mention of the matter of punitive excessiveness indicates that it is
the sole source for substantive limits in this sphere, and that its failure to
include punitive damages within its coverage means that the Constitution
fails to concern itself with the excessiveness of such awards.
Benjamin Zipursky attempts to address this issue by affirming the
Court's exclusion of civilly imposed punitive damages from the criminally
concerned Eighth Amendment but arguing that the "criminal or quasi
criminal idea" embedded in "American punitive damages law today"
warrants "the recognition of an Eighth Amendment right, applied through
the Due Process Clause," to be protected against excessive punitive
damages awards.234 In other words, there are novel quasi-criminal aspects
of punitive damages awards-absent in the traditional common law
model-that justify heightened constitutional scrutiny. 235 One problem
with this argument is that it is unclear how the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment independently carries out this duty apart from mere
incorporation of the Eighth Amendment against the States; there is no
particular reason why these asserted quasi-criminal aspects of punitive
damages call for due process protection against excessive awards rather
than Eighth Amendment protection.236
233. TXO, 509 U.S. at 47 1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. Zipursky, supra note 26, at 1 64-65, 170-7 1 .
235. See id. at 1 66 ("[T]he problem does not lie in the very idea of punitive damages at the
common law, but in a particular direction that punitive damages in tort law has, as it turns out,
developed.").
236. Zipursky does allude to concerns about "the vagueness of . . . penalty guidelines, [and] the
absence of criminal procedural safeguards" that could implicate procedural due process concerns. Id. at
1 63. However, he fails to connect these issues either to the resulting substantive cap that the Court has
imposed or to his own theory that it is the current criminal or quasi-criminal tenor of punitive damages
awards that implicates heightened constitutional scrutiny. His quasi-criminal tenor point only carries
weight if the argument is that the Excessive Fines Clause should apply to punitive damages and does
nothing to support the existence of a procedural or due process right to a substantive cap on punitive
awards.
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Another problem with this argument is that even if there is a novel
"quasi-criminal" aspect to some modern-day punitive awards, Zipursky
concedes that this has been the case "for the past several decades,"237 a
time period within which the Court has considered and rejected the
applicability of the Excessive Fines Clause to modern punitive damages
awards. 238 Thus, even if there were plausible arguments for why punitive
damages today have characteristics that render them amenable to regulation
under the Excessive Fines Clause,239 notwithstanding the fact that such
damages may not have been seen as being within the clause when it was
promulgated, those arguments have not been accepted by the Court. As a
result, absent a direct challenge to the Court's holding of Browning
Ferris-something Zipursky does not attempt or suggest-we must accept
it. Doing so forecloses recourse to the Eighth Amendment for any
justification of the Court's BMW jurisprudence and leaves us with the fact
that discovering an anti-excessiveness principle in the Due Process Clause
renders the Excessive Fines Clause superfluous.
2. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments
The preceding discussion is mostly prologue to a discussion of rules of
constitutional construction the Court may not ignore: those imposed by the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments to the Constitution. The unenumerated rights
doctrine, as enshrined in the Ninth Amendment, provides a rule of
construction that prohibits the Court's reading of the Due Process Clause in
the BMW line of cases. The Ninth Amendment states: "The enumeration in
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people."240 This provision is meant to
indicate that rights beyond those mentioned in the Constitution were
retained by the people; thus, the fact that these retained rights are
unenumerated may not be taken as a license to interpret the Constitution in
a manner that offends them. James Madison devised the amendment as a
rule of construction that would protect against expansive interpretations of
the Constitution that gave the national government the power to limit the
rights of the states and their citizens in areas where the document failed to
provide explicit protection. As one commentator explains, "Madison
conceived the Ninth Amendment in response to calls from state
237. Id. at 170.
238. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1 989).
239. Such arguments are not plausible; it is beyond the scope of this Article, however, to articulate
a defense of the Court's determination that punitive damages are not within the coverage of the Eighth
Amendment.
240. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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conventions that a provision be added limiting the constructive expansion
of federal power into matters properly belonging under state control."241 As
discussed further below, construing due process to empower the federal
government to place substantive limits on the level of punitive damages
that may be imposed by states is just such a "constructive expansion of
federal power" into an area traditionally under state control.
The Tenth Amendment, 242 a companion to the Ninth, 243 compliments
this rule of construction with an express declaration that the States have
only given limited authority to the national government, retaining all other
power and authority they otherwise held and failed to delegate. 244 As James
Madison explained,
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal
government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State
governments are numerous and indefinite . . . . The powers reserved to
the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the
State.245

Justice Chase further explicated these principles on behalf of the Court
in Calder v. Bull:
It appears to me a self-evident proposition, that the several State
Legislatures retain all the powers of legislation, delegated to them by the
state constitutions; which are not EXPRESSLY taken away by the
Constitution of the United States. The establishing courts of justice, the
appointment of judges, and the making regulations for the administration
of justice, within each State, according to its laws, on all subjects not
entrusted to the Federal Government, appears to me to be the peculiar
and exclusive province, and duty of the State Legislatures: All the
powers delegated by the people of the United States to the Federal
24 1 . See Lash, supra note 226, at 394.
242. The Tenth Amendment reads, ''The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
243. See Lash, supra note 226, at 398 ("Other writers of the Founding generation joined Madison
and Tucker in linking the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as twin guardians of federalism.").
244. JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTIONS CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS VINDICATED 49, 172 (De
Capo Press 1970) ( 1820) (''The states, instead of receiving, bestowed powers; and in confirmation of
their authority, reserved every right they had not conceded, whether it is particularly enumerated, or
tacitly retained.").
245. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 3 1 9 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. 1 937). See also
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 176 (Carolina
Academic Press 1987) ( 1 833) (stating that under the Constitution, "every state remains at full liberty to
legislate upon the subject of rights, preferences, contracts, and remedies, as it may please").
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government are defined, and NO CONSTRUCTIVE powers can be exercised

by it. 246

Thus, the clear office of the Tenth Amendment is to indicate that
powers beyond those delegated to the national government may not be
exercised by it, nor may provisions of the Constitution be construed in a
manner that vests the federal government with undelegated powers
reserved to the states.
Together, the Ninth Amendment, which guards "against a latitude of
interpretation,"247 and the Tenth Amendment, which "exclud[es] every
source of power not within the constitution itself,"248 combine to impose a
"federalist rule of constitutional construction"249 that bars any
interpretation of the Constitution that either infringes upon rights retained
by the people or arrogates to the national government power reserved to the
states.250 As St. George Tucker, a contemporary of the Founders, put it,
"the powers delegated to the federal government, are, in all cases, to
receive the most strict construction that the instrument will bear, where the
rights of a state or of the people, either collectively, or individually, may be
drawn in question."251
The question then is whether the people, and derivatively the states,
enjoyed a pre-constitutional, or a pre-Ninth and -Tenth Amendment,252
right to impose exemplary or punitive damages awards on wrongdoers in
an amount of their choosing. It is clear that juries imposed damages
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387 (1 798).
Madison, supra note 224, at 489. See also Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means
What It Says 3 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Public Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Group, Paper No. 05-14, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789384 ("[T)he Ninth
Amendment . . . argues against a latitudinarian interpretation of federal powers.").
248. Madison, supra note 224, at 489.
249. Lash, supra note 226, at 410.
250. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Conse rvatives, Liberals, Romantics: The Persistent Quest for
Certainty in Constitutional Interpretation, 50 VAND. L. REV. 613, 641 (1997). Gedicks states:
[T]he Ninth and Tenth Amendments could be understood as complementary jurisdictional
statements, together confirming that the states retained sovereign power over individual
common law and state constitutional rights not enumerated in the Constitution, and that the
federal government could exercise sovereign power only over those matters expressly
delegated to it by the Constitution.
Id. See also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Fonn Method
in Constitutional Interpretation, l08 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1243 n.72 (1 995) ('The Ninth and Tenth
Amendments should caution us against 'penumbra) thinking' with respect to grants of national
government power." (quoting Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1639, I 657 (1 995))).
251 . WILLIAM B LACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES, Note D Appendix, 154.
252. The ten amendments that comprise the Bill of Rights were ratified on December 15, 1791.
Organic Laws of the United States of America, 1 U.S.C. p. LXII n.12 (2000).
246.
247.
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exceeding the amount needed to compensate plaintiffs both prior to253 and
after254 the adoption of the Constitution. Such cases reflect a clear belief
that where challenged conduct is found to have been particularly "wanton"
or reprehensible, an exemplary award is in order.255 The early New Jersey
case of Coryell v. Colbaugh is particularly illustrative of this view. After
finding the defendant liable for breach of a promise to marry:
The Chief Justice, in his charge to the jury, said that the injury
complained of was of the most atrocious and dishonorable nature, and
called for exemplary damages. That such conduct went to destroy the
peace and prospects, not only of the injured woman, but to render
families and parents wretched by the ruin of their children. He told the
jury that they were not to estimate the damages by any particular proof
of suffering or actual loss; but to give damages for example 's sake, to
prevent such offences in future; and also to allow liberal damages for the
breach of a sacred promise and the great disadvantages which must
follow to her through life. That in this case they were to consider not
only the past injury, but every consequence in future. He repeated in very
strong terms his detestation of such conduct, and told the jury they were
bound to no certain damages, but might give such a sum as would mark
their disapprobation, and be an example to others.256

Joan v. Shield 's Lessee is in accord:
[T]he jury, who were respectable inhabitants of that county, were so well
satisfied that the entry and ouster was so violent as to deserve exemplary
damages, that they gave such as should deter others from such
proceedings; they showed their detestation of the same, and gave
damages accordingly. This will appear on viewing the quantity of land
recovered. It could not be for any mesne profits, for they were
insignificant, as nothing of that sort appears on the record, and the jury
were the proper judges of the damages sustained by the entry and ouster;
the law will always presume that what they have done is right. 257

More recent recognition of the traditionally unconstrained authority of
juries to impose punitive damages has already been referenced.258 It thus
seems clear that the unconstrained authority of the people to impose
punitive awards through juries is a pre-Ninth and -Tenth Amendment
power not delegated to the federal government but retained by the people.
253.
254.
(1791).
255.
256.
257.
258.

See, e.g., Genay v. Norris, I S.C.L. 3, 3 (I Bay 6, 7) (1784).
See, e.g., Coryell v. Colbaugh, I N.J.L. 77, 77-78 (original pagination, 90-91 of the reporter)
Genay, I S.C.L. at 3 ( I Bay at 7).
Coryell, I N.J.L. at 77-78 (original pagination, 91 of the reporter) (second emphasis added).
Joan v. Shield's Lessee, 3 H. & McH. 7, 8 (Md. 1790) (emphasis added).
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 114, 187-88, 2 16.
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By interpreting the Due Process Clause in a manner that co-opts the
authority of state juries to determine the appropriate level of punitive
damages and instead permits the Court to do so, the Court has engaged in
precisely the expansive and aggrandizing constitutional interpretation
prohibited by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. The Ninth Amendment is
offended because interpreting due process as placing limits on the level of
punitive damages that juries may award disparages the right retained by the
people to determine the appropriate level themselves. Even though no
express constitutional provision protects the right of the people, because of
juries' right to award punitive damages in an amount of their choosing, no
one has ever questioned that such a right was retained.259 Construing the
Due Process Clause to limit this right by implication does the very thing the
Ninth Amendment was designed to forbid; it enables the Court to construe
the Constitution in a manner that disparages clear retained rights. Thus, it
may be permissible to give a more expansive interpretation to a clause in
the Constitution when that interpretation does not infringe on clear rights
retained by the people. Although when an interpretation usurps an
indisputable and long-standing principle, such as the jury's authority to
impose punitive damages awards as they see fit, it transgresses the text,
meaning, and spirit of the Ninth Amendment.
The Tenth Amendment is offended for much the same reason. Prior to
the adoption of the Constitution, states had the authority to determine
appropriate levels of punitive damages awards, and no provision of that
document delegates such authority to the national government. Thus, the
power is reserved to the states and the Court's contrary determination that
it holds that power violates the Tenth Amendment's guarantee of a federal
government of limited, delegated powers.260 Indeed, the Court's affront to
the Tenth Amendment becomes more apparent when one considers the
implications of allowing the Court to interpret the Constitution to convey a
power not expressly delegated to the national government. Under the
Court's view, if due process bars states from imposing punitive damages
awards beyond a certain level, Congress could pass a statute-pursuant to
259. See Barry v. Edmunds, l16 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) ("[N]othing is better settled than that . . . it
is the peculiar function of the jury to determine the amount [of punitive damages] by their verdict.");
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851) (affirming the century-old principle that juries
may impose punitive damages).
260. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) ("[N]o one disputes the proposition
that '(t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers.'" (quoting Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (199 1 ))); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or
forgotten, the constitution is written.").
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its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.261 For
example, Congress could declare, "No state may impose a punitive
damages award greater than nine times the amount of compensatory
damages." If the Court is right about the due process constraints on
punitive damages, such a statute would be within Congress's Section 5
enforcement authority, provided the legislation reached state action
prohibited by the Due Process Clause or, if the legislation went beyond that
scope, there was "proportionality or congruence between the means
adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. "262
But as discussed earlier,263 Congress does not possess-at least not by
virtue of the Due Process Clause-such authority over the common law
practices of the states: 264
Should . . . the common Jaw be held, like other laws, liable to revision
and alteration, by the authority of Congress; it then follows, that the
authority of Congress is co-extensive with the objects of common law;
that is to say, with every object of legislation: For to every such object
261. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ('The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.").
262. City of Boerne v. Hores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997). The Court has indicated that
Congress's Section 5 enforcement power is broad, and "includes 'the authority both to remedy and to
deter violation of rights guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat broader
swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."' Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004) (quoting Kimel v. Aa. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)). Justice
Scalia has vigorously opposed the notion that Section 5 enforcement legislation may reach conduct not
itself prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 559 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Nothing in § 5
allows Congress to go beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to proscribe, prevent, or
'remedy' conduct that does not itselfviolate any provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
263. See supra text accompanying notes 213-15.
264. The Court's recent decision in Gonzales v. Raich indicates that Congress's authority to
regulate interstate commerce is broad enough to permit the regulation of wholly intrastate economic
activity. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2204--06 (2005). It is thus possible to imagine Congress
using its Commerce Clause power as interpreted in Raich to regulate punitive damages on the basis of
their impact on interstate commerce, if one considered the imposition of punitive damages "economic
activity." In fact, the Court has alluded to the interstate commerce concerns raised by high punitive
damages awards. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) ("Indeed, [BMW's]
status as an active participant in the national economy implicates the federal interest in preventing
individual States from imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce."). Congress has considered
such legislation in the past, invoking its authority under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Product
Liability Reform Act of 1998, S. 2236, 105th Cong. §§ 2, 1 1 0 (a)( l ), (b) (1998) (proposing to establish
a clear-and-convincing evidence rule and caps on punitive damage awards); Product Liability Reform
Act of 1997, S. 5, 105th Cong. §§ 2, 108(b) (1997) (proposing to cap punitive damage awards); H.R.
956, 104th Cong. §§ 102, 201 (a)-(b) (1995) (proposing to establish uniform legal standards and caps
on punitive damage awards); H.R. 955, 104th Cong. § 8(a)-(b) ( 1995) (failing to expressly invoke the
Commerce Clause but proposing to establish a clear-and-convincing evidence rule and caps on punitive
damage awards). Whether Congress's Commerce Clause power would permit it to limit punitive
damages awards imposed by states is a matter beyond the scope of this Article.
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does some branch or other of the common law extend. The authority of
Congress would therefore be no longer under the limitations, marked out
in the constitution. They would be authorized to legislate in all cases
whatsoever.265

Any interpretation of due process that would permit Congress to
supplant state common law practices with its own common law preferences
would be an interpretation at odds with the idea that the national
government is one of limited authority. That, however, is what the Court's
excessiveness jurisprudence does. The Court has given itself, and
presumably Congress, via its Section 5 enforcement authority, power that
no provision of the Constitution delegates to the federal government: the
power to determine what level of punitive damages is sufficient to achieve
states' goals of punishment and deterrence.
Finally, it must be noted that the force of the Seventh Amendment
strengthens the arguments made above under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments because it expressly preserves the right of trial by jury as it
existed prior to the ratification of the Bill of Rights at common law,
rendering constructive limitations on jury discretion even more suspect.
The Seventh Amendment provides, in part, "In Suits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved."266 At the time of the Founding, the civil jury
was a revered institution that was seen as a guard against the excesses of
governmental authority and oppression. The importance of the civil jury to
American colonists is most exemplified by the closely followed English
case of Wilkes v. Wood.261 Wilkes, an outspoken member of parliament
who spoke out in favor of the rights of American colonists, had been
wrongfully arrested for his critical remarks of Lord Halifax and brought
suit against the Crown in response.268 The jury awarded Wilkes £1,000, an
amount the Crown argued was vastly in excess of Wilkes's actual
damages.269 Rejecting this challenge, Lord Chief Justice Pratt wrote:
[A] jury have it in their power to give damages for more than the injury
received. Damages are designed . . . as a punishment to the guilty, to
265. See James Madison, Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES
MADISON, WRITINGS 639 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1 999).
266. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
267. Wilkes v. Wood, (1 763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (Westminster Ct. of Common Pleas).
268. See generally R.W. POSTGATE, THAT DEVIL WILKES ( 1929) (detailing the public life of John
Wilkes); GEORGE RUDI�, WILKES AND LIBERTY: A SOCIAL STUDY OF 1763 TO 1774 ( 1 %2) (analyzing
the nature and significance of the "Wilkite" social movement in London instigated by John Wilkes).
269. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. at 493, 499.
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deter from any such proceeding for the future, and as a proof of the
detestation of the jury to the action itself."270

This authority of civil juries to impose exemplary damages as a means
of punishing the guilty and deterring other similar conduct carried over into
the colonies where the institution of the jury became critical to protecting
colonists against excesses of the Crown.271 The Crown's interference with
the authority of the jury was "'one of the important grievances leading to
the break with England"' and a key impetus behind the development and
ratification of the Seventh Amendment. 272
The right of juries to impose punitive damages was clearly an
important component of the common law and should be treated as an
element that the Seventh Amendment has preserved. However, even if one
were not inclined to inculcate the Seventh Amendment's jury protections
with any particular respect to discretionary punitive awards, the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments verify that the right cannot be constructively read out
of the Constitution and placed in the hands of the national government. To
do so would impermissibly alter the architecture of the governmental
structure established by the Constitution,273 a national government of
limited and delegated powers balanced by states that retained their
preexisting, undelegated powers, and by the authority of the civil jury as it
existed at common law.274 Disrupting this balance by permitting the federal
270. Id. at 498-99.
271. White, supra note 191, at 83.
272. Id. at 83-84 (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 340 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting)).
273. The concept of the "architecture" of constitutionally established structure of government was
borrowed from Laurence Tribe. He asserts that the text of the Constitution "does indeed define an
architecture-a connected structure rather than simply a sequence of directives, powers, and
prohibitions" and thus requires interpreters of the document to "take structure as well as text seriously."
Tribe, supra note 250, at 1236. To do so, Tribe states, "one must attend to the 'topology' of the
edifice-those fundamental features that define how its components interlock and that identify the basic
geometry of their interconnected composition." Id.
274. It would not be too far fetched to note that the constitutional guarantee of a republican form
of government for each of the states, in conjunction with the various constitutional guarantees of jury
trials, also contributes to this architecture, guaranteeing that within the states, each citizen will be an
important component of the political decisionmaking process-both as voters and jurors-thereby
"safeguard[ing] liberty to ensure that never again will the people of this country be under the bee! of a
tyrant." Charles I. Lugosi, Reflections from Embassy Lakes, Florida: The Effective Teaching of
Criminal Law, 48 ST. Loms U. L.J. 1337, 1348 (2004). See U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 4.
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government to invade the traditional province of the civil jury by
constrammg and second-guessing its discretion gives the national
government power over the states and the people, which the Seventh,
Ninth, and Tenth Amendments have been designed to forbid.
In sum, although the Court is the ultimate expositor of the meaning of
the Constitution, it is constrained in how it may construe provisions of that
document. Key among those constraints is that retained, though
unenumerated, rights may not be abridged through constructive
implication. Also, powers not expressly delegated to the national
government may not be expropriated by implication when they have been
reserved to the states, particularly in view of the Seventh Amendment's
express protections for the institution and authority of the civil jury. By
failing to hold itself to these limitations on its interpretive authority, the
Court has threatened the notion of a limited federal government,275 and has
used the Due Process Clause as a "pretext . . . for the accomplishment of
objects not entrusted to the government."276
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Having now thoroughly critiqued the Court's excessiveness
jurisprudence as being rooted in an unprecedented, untenable, and
impermissible construction of the Due Process Clause, it now remains to
determine what constraints, if any, the Constitution does place on the award
of punitive damages. Due process plays a role with respect to punitive
damages awards, but it is drastically more limited than the Court would
have it. Defendants certainly are entitled to be on notice regarding what
conduct will lead to what type of consequences. Further, defendants do
deserve protection against arbitrary exercises of state power. But the Due
Process Clause fails to suggest that there should be any numerical or
proportionality limitations on the actual size of punitive awards. It is for
states to determine how reprehensible various offenses are to state interests
Justice Breyer would likely include this state of popular sovereignty and political engagement as
part of ltis notion of "active liberty," wltich he adopts from political pltilosopher Benjamin Constant and
defines as "a sltaring of a nation's sovereign authority among that nation's citizens," involving citizens
in "an active and constant participation in collective power" including tlte rights of public deliberation,
voting, and holding wrongdoers accountable for their misdeeds. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE
LIBERTY 3-5 (2005).
2 75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ('The distinction, between a
government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons
on whom they are imposed.").
276. Cf McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (discussing the Necessary
and Proper Clause of the Constitution).
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when they authorize punitive damages to be imposed and for juries and
state courts to determine reprehensibility and desert in particular cases.
This Part of the Article proposes a framework of constitutional constraints
on the award of punitive damages more in line with the Constitution than
the excessiveness jurisprudence of the Court.
A. CULPABILITY BEYOND SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE
The starting point for scrutinizing punitive damages is the legitimate
goals of the state that they seek to promote: punishment and deterrence.
The Supreme Court has recognized these goals as legitimate state interests
that states may rightly pursue through the imposition of punitive damages
awards. 277 Thus, if punitive damages are imposed in instances where
punishment and deterrence goals are not implicated, state power creeps into
a sphere of arbitrariness that notions of due process rightly forbid.
How can there be an objective, principled determination of instances
in which the state's legitimate goals of punishment and deterrence are not
implicated? At the very least, when negligent conduct is at issue, it is
difficult to argue that there should be punishment beyond full victim
compensation given the unintentional nature of the actions in question.
Similarly, deterrence objectives are not significantly implicated in the face
of negligent conduct because the conduct at issue is accidental rather than
intentional, meaning that the simple encouragement of the exercise of due
care is needed rather than the discouragement of conscious wrongdoing.
Most persons are chastened to exercise sufficient care to avoid accidental
harms simply by the fact that they will bear the cost of any harm their
negligence might cause.278 lt thus appears that the imposition of punitive
damages on tortfeasors liable for simple negligence would be unconnected
with a state interest in punishment and deterrence, which in turn would
render a punitive award in this context an arbitrary exercise of state power.
As such, the Due Process Clause rightly should be viewed as
prohibiting the imposition of punitive damages in cases involving simple
277. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) ("Punitive damages may properly
be imposed to further a State's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deterring its
repetition.").
278. Although insurance coverage can mitigate the costs borne by negligent tortfeasors, it does not
necessarily eliminate all costs. For example, one responsible for a car accident may have the tab picked
up by his or her insurer, but the insurer typically raises the insured's premiums in response, imposing a
direct-though lower-cost on the responsible party.
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negligence. 279 Stated differently, due process requires that punitive
damages be reserved for culpability beyond simple negligence, which
would include instances of repeated negligence by the same actor.280 This
limitation is consistent with the tradition of punitive damages in this
country and in England.281 States already require heightened culpability to
impose punitive damages awards,282 making this limitation a background
requirement that the Supreme Court should not find itself needing to
enforce.
279. This discussion only addresses limitations imposed by due process. The Supreme Court has
held that the First Amendment requires heightened culpability when imposing punishment against
publishers found to have defamed private individuals. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 34849 (1974) (holding that in defamation suits by private individuals against publishers or broadcasters
"the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not
based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth").
280. Carruthers v. Tillman, 2 N.C. 648, 648 (I Hayw. 501 ) (1797). Carruthers states:
[l]t is not proper in the first instance [of a nuisance! to give exemplary damages, but such only
as will compensate for actual loss . . . . [B]ut if after this the nuisance should be continued,
and a new action brought, then the damages should be so exemplary as to compel an
abatement of the nuisance.
Id.

281 . Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 1 1 5 U.S. 512, 521 (1885) ("[l]n England and in this country,
[damages] have been allowed in excess of compensation, whenever malice, gross neglect, or oppression
has caused or accompanied the commission of the injury complained of."); Emblen v. Myers, (1860)
158 Eng. Rep. 23, 23 (Ct. Exchequer) (holding that "[i!n an action for wilful [sic] negligence, the jury
may take into consideration the motives of the defendant, and if the negligence is accompanied with a
contempt of the plaintiffs rights and convenience, the jury may give exemplary damages").
282. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) (West 2005) (requiring clear and convincing evidence of
"oppression, fraud, or malice" to support an award of exemplary damages); Bell v. Heitkamp, Inc., 728
A.2d 743, 752 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) ("[F]acts showing actual malice must be pleaded, and if the
case goes to trial, plaintiff must prove entitlement to punitive damages by clear and convincing
evidence."). Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (Ohio 1987). Preston states:
We therefore hold that actual malice, necessary for an award of punitive damages, is (l) that
state of mind under which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of
revenge, or (2) a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great
probability of causing substantial harm.
Id. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. 2005). Hutchison states:
[l]n Pennsylvania, a punitive damages claim must be supported by evidence sufficient to
establish that (1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the
plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to act, as the case may be, in conscious
disregard of that risk.
Id. Wischer v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Arn., Inc., 694 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Wis. 2005) ("Punitive
damages are not recoverable if a wrongdoer's conduct is merely negligent. Only when the wrongdoer's
conduct is so aggravated that it meets the elevated standard of an 'intentional disregard of rights' should
a circuit court send the issue of punitive damages to a jury." (quoting Strenke v. Hogner, 694 N.W.2d
296, 301 (Wis. 2005))).
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B. JURY DISCRETION CONSTRAINED BY THE GOALS OF PUNISHMENT AND
DETERRENCE

Next, because states may only impose punitive damages in pursuit of
the goals of punishment and deterrence, juries must be instructed to
constrain their award to the minimum level that in their view would further
those goals. The punitive award must at least purport to be one that is
derived with reference to promoting the goals of punishment and
deterrence. A punitive damages award becomes arbitrary if it is imposed
without an eye toward these objectives. Thus, state law providing for
punitive damages must require courts to instruct juries to impose an amount
based on the jurors' views of what is needed to achieve these goals. That
means that jurors must be instructed that they should not include within a
punitive damages award any amount intended to compensate the plaintiff
for any injury. Additionally, jurors must be instructed that they may not be
moved by bias or prejudice in calculating a proper punitive damages award,
but must focus solely on determining an amount that would punish the
wrongdoing adequately and to deter others from behaving similarly.283
C. NO IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF OUT-OF-STATE CONDUCT

The Court has properly indicated that the limits of state sovereignty
preclude states from punishing defendants "for conduct that may have been
lawful where it occurred" or from using their laws to impose punitive
damages for unlawful out-of-state conduct.284 The Court, however, has also
affirmed that out-of-state conduct providing evidence of defendants'
culpability and intent respecting their actions against plaintiffs may be
considered by juries.285 Juries must be informed of these limitations and
instructed to punish only the conduct of defendants vis-a-vis their
respective plaintiffs, not broader conduct affecting others elsewhere.
283. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 (1989) ("[I]t is
not disputed that a jury award may not be upheld if it was the product of bias or passion.").
284. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003); BMW of N. Am.,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73 (1996).
285. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 574 n.21 (indicating that "evidence describing out-of-state
transactions . . . . may be relevant to the determination of the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct"). See also id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia says:
But if a person has been held subject to punishment because he committed an unlawful act,
the degree of his punis�ment assuredly can be increased on the basis of any other conduct of
his that displays his wickedness, unlawful or not. Criminal sentences can be computed, we
have said, on the basis of "information concerning every aspect of a defendant's life."
Id. (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949)).
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D. MEANINGFUL TRIAL COURT SCRUTINY AND APPELLATE REVIEW

Although jurors need to be told to constrain their award to an amount
no greater than needed to achieve the state's legitimate goals, it is always
possible that they will miss the mark in that regard. In such an event, any
amount of the punitive award beyond that needed to achieve the state's
legitimate goals would constitute an "erroneous deprivation," to use the
language of Mathews v. Eldridge.286 As a result, to ensure that a punitive
damages award is limited to an amount sufficient to achieve punishment
and deterrence, meaningful and adequate review of jury awards by trial
court judges and state appellate courts must be available.
Review by the trial court should simply verify that the jury had before
it facts that would support the jury's award with reference to factors such
as: the actual level of the defendant's culpability, the intent of the
defendant, the state's interest in deterring others from similar conduct and
protecting the public from such wrongdoing, the impact of conduct on the
victim and others, the defendant's wealth, and any mitigating
circumstances. Trial courts must also make certain that the jury did not
seek to punish out-of-state conduct through its award, which can be
addressed both through proper jury instructions to that effect and upon
review of the award.
State appellate review must also be available, not only as a check on
the trial court's validation of a jury award, but also to check for intrasystem
consistency between a given award and others imposed under similar
circumstances. If similarly situated defendants are facing wildly divergent
punitive damages awards within a state's judicial system, the state's
exercise of its power to impose such damages begins to appear arbitrary.
Although no two cases will have identical facts and thus some variance in
punitive awards is to be expected, similar offenses under similar
circumstances warrant similar punishment. This cannot be a rigid
requirement; where facts and circumstances warranting a departure from
the typical punitive award are identified, a state appellate court may
properly endorse the award without rendering the state's punitive damages
regime arbitrary. An unexplained or unwarranted departure, however, is
constitutionally problematic because it suggests that the award exceeds the
amount deemed in other similar cases to be sufficient to achieve the state's
legitimate goals, rendering the award in question arbitrary in the manner
described above.287
286.
287.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 3 19, 335 ( 1976).
See supra Part lV.B.
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What is required by due process here is that states have available a
process whereby judicial review of jury awards is undertaken with an eye
toward ensuring that punitive damages awards are limited to an amount that
furthers the goals of punishment and deterrence and that the award is
broadly consistent with awards imposed under similar circumstances. This
judgment is for juries and state courts to make, and as discussed above, due
process does not require or permit federal courts to make these
determinations. Thus, once the state's highest court has weighed in on the
matter, their determination regarding the propriety of the award is final,
provided the procedural protections outlined above have been respected. In
the end, then, the Supreme Court's constitutional review would be limited
to assuring that these constitutionally required procedures are respected,
with no authority to revisit the state's determination of whether an award of
a given amount is appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
The task of courts with respect to the Constitution is-to the extent
possible-to give its passages a meaning consistent with what their texts
meant at the time they were drafted and adopted rather than what judges
might like them to mean today.288 Courts must make certain that the
interpretation is consistent with other provisions of the document and the
overall structure of government the Constitution creates. Concocting
constitutional limitations that the text fails to reveal or support, and that
history fails to endorse, is not the product of judicial interpretation, but of
judicial creation.289 If the Court perceives there to be a substantive legal
protection that members of the polity should have, it should limit itself to
noting the gap and suggesting that appropriate political bodies, Congress
and state legislatures, attend to the matter. This admonition is particularly
apropos when dealing with the Due Process Clause. As the Court long ago
rightly observed:
The due process clause does not impose upon the States a duty to
establish ideal systems for the administration of justice . . . .
288. Of course, the effort to discern the original meaning of constitutional provisions is not a
simple or precise endeavor. See Scalia, supra note 20, at 45 (''There is plenty of room for disagreement
as to what original meaning was, and even more as to how that original meaning applies to the situation
before the court.").
289. Cf Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 95, 108 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (describing the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretation throughout the 1950s
and 1960s as "creative judicial elaboration"); Scalia, supra note 20, at 18 (describing the "legislative
intent" approach to statutory interpretation as "a handy cover for judicial intent").
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However desirable it is that the old forms of procedure be improved with
the progress of time, it cannot rightly be said that the Fourteenth
Amendment furnishes a universal and self-executing remedy. Its
function is negative, not affirmative, and it carries no mandate for
particular measures of reform.290

Thus, although punitive damages reform might be a legitimate policy
objective, using the Due Process Clause to achieve it cannot plausibly be
condoned in light of the historical understanding of the clause or the
Court's broader modem day due process jurisprudence. Neither can such
use of the clause be defended in view of states' traditional, undelegated
authority to fix and impose punitive damages and those constitutional rules
of construction that bar constructive disparagement of that authority. Some
might argue that the clause should be given a flexible interpretation that
accounts for new legal challenges and that the relatively recent explosion of
punitive damages awards is such a challenge. Although the magnitude of
the punitive awards that concern the Court does appear to be a more
modem phenomenon, the meaning of due process should not be flexed to
curb perceived excesses surrounding a practice that no text in the
Constitution purports to control. The presence of a provision addressing
punitive excessiveness-the Eighth Amendment-and its failure to
constrain punitive damages awards strongly suggests that the formalized
amendment process of Article V rather than the informal process of
amending by constructive implication would be the more legitimate route
to achieving the Court's goal of imposing constitutional limits on
exemplary damages.
Beyond the historical and doctrinal difficulties with the Court's
excessiveness jurisprudence, one may marvel at how odd it is for the Court
ardently to impose prohibitions against punitive dollar awards beyond a
certain amount while it freely permits states to imprison petty repeat
offenders to life imprisonment.291 On the one hand, the Constitution
290. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-12 (1921).
291. Other commentators have made a similar observation. See Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 226, 325 (2003). Leading Cases states:
[F]rom a purely doctrinal perspective, the Court's treatment of punitive damages in State
Farm is in tension with its treatment of criminal sentences last Term in Ewing v. California,
in which it upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life imprisonment imposed under
California's "Three Strikes" law on a defendant who shoplifted $1200 worth of golf clubs.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive
Punishment, 91 VA. L. REV. 677, 699 n. l 02 (2005). Lee says:
The Court's proportionality jurisprudence looks even more i ncoherent if we keep in mind the
much-noted tension between the Court's general reluctance in the Eighth Amendment
proportionality cases and its relatively enthusiastic embrace of proportionality regulation of
punitive damages under the Due Process Clause, an article-length topic in its own right.
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explicitly proscribes cruel and unusual punishment, but the Court finds no
obstacle therein to the imposition of society's penultimate penal sanction
endless imprisonment-for petty but recidivist thieves. 292 On the other
hand, the Constitution says nothing about a bar against excessive punitive
damages, but the Court bends over backwards to twist the document in a
manner that regards monetary sanctions beyond single-digit multiples as
breathtaking, eyebrow-raising affronts to constitutional sensibilities that
must be combated. From the outside looking in, one would gaze upon such
a state of affairs and conclude that the Court cares more about protecting
businesses against high-dollar payouts than it does about protecting
individual convicts from draconian measures that leave them languishing in
prison for the rest of their lives. Such is hardly the case; however, one must
wonder why no judicial eyebrows are raised on behalf of these unfortunate
lifers in the face of Eighth Amendment protections that one might have
thought were in place to offer these souls some relief.
What is good for the goose should be good for the gander: if the
express protection against "cruel and unusual" punishments fails to
constrain states from permanently locking up petty recidivists, then the
authority of states to impose stiff punitive damages awards should not be
deemed to be limited in the absence of any express (or plausibly implicit)
provision to that effect. Life imprisonment for petty repeat offenders might
be viewed by many as excessive or "unusual" in that it is a greater penalty
than needed to achieve the state's legitimate goals of punishment and
deterrence; the Court, however, has not seen fit to second-guess those states
that see matters differently. The Court should similarly refrain from
second-guessing state judgments regarding proper levels of punitive
damages awards.
In any event, punitive damages awards that are the product of the
process suggested in this Article have given defendants their due. A
defendant who has chosen to act in a jurisdiction with given standards for
awarding punitive damages, who has failed to convince a jury and/or a trial
judge that no award or a lower one would be more appropriate, and who
has failed to convince state appellate courts that the standards for imposing
such awards were neglected in some way has no recourse to the federal
Constitution to challenge what has occurred as a transgression of due
292. See, e.g., Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 263 (1980) (holding that a life sentence imposed
after only a third nonviolent felony conviction did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under
the Eighth Amendment). See also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 63, 77 (2003) (holding that
imposition of a life sentence for petty theft was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of the
clearly established gross disproportionality principle set forth by the decisions of the Court).
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process. To the contrary, the threat of such damages in that event would
have been clear and the courts of the state would have provided review
sufficient to ensure that the jury was not wildly off the mark in selecting a
given amount. States, through the apparatus of the legislature, the civil jury,
and the state judiciary should be left free to make the determination that the
challenged conduct of the defendant warrants a particular level of
approbation reflected in an approved punitive award. No principle of
federal constitutional law presently steps in to scrutinize that ultimate
conclusion. The Court's insistence on using the concept of due process to
impose such scrutiny makes the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
all the more resonant today:
I have not yet adequately expressed the more than anxiety that I feel at
the ever increasing scope given to the Fourteenth Amendment in cutting
down what I believe to be the constitutional rights of the States. As the
decisions now stand, I see hardly any limit but the sky to the invalidating
of those rights if they happen to strike a majority of this Court as for any
reason undesirable. 293

The Court should abandon its present course and set right the doctrinal
damage it has done.
293.

Baldwin v. Missouri, 28 1 U.S. 586, 595 ( 1930) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

